Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add instructions/lamasu/physical-capability-cloud/claude-mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/LamaSu/physical-capability-cloudWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.12990 | $0.12990 |
| Opus 5 | $0.06495 | $0.06495 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.02598 | $0.02598 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.01299 | $0.01299 |
Grade C, and why
physical-capability-cloud CLAUDE.md scanned grade C with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
Dangerous keywords (rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push --force, drop table, curl | sh) are scored 0.0-1.0. Actions scoring >0.5 are dual-logged and may be denied per agent allowlist. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
**Configuration** (add to Claude Code settings or `~/.claude/settings.json`): Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
Dangerous keywords (rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push --force, drop table, curl | sh) are scored 0.0-1.0. Actions scoring >0.5 are dual-logged and may be denied per agent allowlist. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
Dangerous keywords (rm -rf, git reset --hard, git push --force, drop table, curl | sh) are scored 0.0-1.0. Actions scoring >0.5 are dual-logged and may be denied per agent allowlist. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,048 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MANDATORY: DGX Spark Offload
ALWAYS check Spark availability (spark-check) at session start and offload ALL builds, tests, and heavy work to the DGX Spark (192.168.108.72, 119GB RAM). The local machine has only 16GB RAM and WILL OOM on builds, parallel tests, and multi-agent workloads. Use spark-run for everything. No exceptions.
spark-run "cd ~/projects/physical-capability-cloud && pnpm build --concurrency=1"— buildspark-run "cd ~/projects/physical-capability-cloud && pnpm --workspace-concurrency=1 -r test"— testspark-run "cd ~/projects/physical-capability-cloud && pnpm install"— install- If Spark is down, use
--concurrency=1locally and warn the user about OOM risk.
MANDATORY: Security — Gate A Vetting Pipeline
All new tools, MCP servers, npm packages, and external dependencies MUST pass through Gate A vetting before being approved for use in this project.
How to Vet
- Run
/vet <package-path>on any new tool/package before integration - Runs up to 7 scanners: Trivy (vulns+SBOM), Gitleaks (secrets), ClamAV (malware), npm audit, pip-audit, Semgrep (SAST), prompt injection detection
- Scanners degrade gracefully if not installed. Prompt injection scanner always runs.
Policy Thresholds (from ~/.claude/plugins/vetting-policy.json)
- Critical vulnerabilities: 0 allowed (auto-reject)
- High vulnerabilities: max 2 (warn on any)
- Medium vulnerabilities: max 10
- Secrets in source: 0 allowed (auto-reject)
- Malware: auto-reject, no override
- Prompt injection signals: max 1 (warn on any)
Verdicts
- PASS: Clean, auto-approved
- WARN: Suspicious findings, human reviews before use
- FAIL: Critical vulns, secrets, or malware — auto-rejected
When to Vet
- Before adding any new npm dependency to any package
- Before integrating any MCP server
- Before running any third-party script
- After forging a new MCP server with
/forge - Reports saved to
ai/supervisor/forge_approvals/
MANDATORY: Action Classification
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 1,048 lines · 12,990 tokens per session scan C 5124d039a507
physical-capability-cloud CLAUDE.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository LamaSu/physical-capability-cloud (1 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 12,990 tokens to every session, about $0.0649 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 4 findings (downloads and executes remote code, reads agent configuration directories, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other instructions, from other repositories
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plan-forge azd.instructions.md
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plan-forge terraform.instructions.md
Terraform Azure patterns — file structure, providers, state, naming, security, testing.
plan-forge naming.instructions.md
Azure naming conventions — Microsoft CAF abbreviations, constraints, uniqueness, tagging.