What the reviewer found
Russian-language runbook for the author's own self-hosted Tavily MCP relay on their own VPS: the curl calls hit their own sslip.io endpoint for diagnostics, the SSH key and chmod root:root describe their own server's access and permissions, and rm -rf only removes the project's own /opt and /etc paths during an documented uninstall. Nothing reaches outside the author's own infrastructure or reads a third party's credentials.
installs-software— installs softwarenetwork— calls the vendor’s API
What was read
The file as it ships in vokasug/tavily-mcp-proxy:
AGENTS.md
What the static scan said
The scan flagged 5things. The reviewer kept 0 and dismissed 5 as false.
E1Sends data to an external URL — false positivePE2Asks for root — false positivePE3Reaches for credential files — false positiveRMRecursive force delete — false positiveNETMakes network calls — false positive
How this review was made
Sonnet 5 read the files above on 7 September 2026 and answered three questions: is it dangerous to whoever installs it, is each scanner finding real, and what should the installer know. The verdict is bound to the file's hash; when the file changes, it is scanned afresh and reviewed again. A script that changes while the definition does not is not re-reviewed — that is a known gap. How the scan and the review work.