Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to WaseemGhanem98/AgentCheck. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/WaseemGhanem98/AgentCheck/main/AGENTS.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/WaseemGhanem98/AgentCheckWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/waseemghanem98/agentcheck/agents-md)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/waseemghanem98/agentcheck/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/waseemghanem98/agentcheck/agents-md/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/waseemghanem98/agentcheck/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/waseemghanem98/agentcheck/agents-md.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.01617 | $0.01617 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00647 | $0.00647 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00323 | $0.00323 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00162 | $0.00162 |
Grade A, and why
AgentCheck AGENTS.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AGENTS.md — working on AgentCheck
Instructions for AI coding agents and new contributors working in this
repository. Read this before changing anything under agentcheck/.
What this project is
AgentCheck is an evidence authority for AI-agent behavior, not a framework
compatibility layer. It imports a trusted local agent, derives adversarial
scenarios from what it finds, and runs them in same-user child processes where
declared tool calls are simulated. It emits PASS / FAIL / INCONCLUSIVE /
INFRA_ERROR, an HTML report, and a replay manifest.
The product's value is that its verdicts can be trusted. Every rule below exists to protect that.
Keep four evidence dimensions separate: contained, observed, semantically
understood, and policy-verifiable. One never implies the next. A blocked and
observed runtime action with unknown semantics remains INCONCLUSIVE, never a
PASS. Static discovery is lower-bounded, not exhaustive.
Non-negotiable invariants
Breaking any of these is a correctness bug, not a style issue:
- The original tool handler never executes during a simulated evaluation. Interception replaces the invoker before the handler is reached.
- Unknown tools fail closed. Never synthesize a tool result.
- No real mutations. Only the simulated world changes.
- Worker isolation. Scenarios run in child processes; the environment allowlist is empty by default. This is trusted-code process isolation, not a hostile-code sandbox.
- Network denied by default, and containment failures surface. The current Python guard is not a kernel security boundary and must not be described as one.
INCONCLUSIVEandINFRA_ERRORnever collapse intoPASS.- Redaction at the artifact and log boundary, before writing or printing.
- Never overstate replay. It reproduces inputs and harness behavior, not model determinism.
Layout
| Path | Role |
|---|---|
agentcheck/domain/ |
Contract models: scenarios, specs, runs, verdicts, findings. Fingerprinted and versioned. |
agentcheck/adapters/ |
The only layer allowed to import a framework SDK. |
agentcheck/inspect/ |
Import a target and extract an AgentSpec without running a turn. |
agentcheck/generate/ |
Derive, lint, select, and freeze suites. |
agentcheck/coverage/ |
Derived behavioral coverage over a spec and a scenario set. Pure contract analysis; imports no target. |
agentcheck/runner/ |
Orchestrator, worker, tool gateway, simulated world, budgets, network guard. |
agentcheck/evaluate/ |
Oracle evaluation and verdict assignment. |
agentcheck/replay/ |
Manifests, source binding, filesets. |
agentcheck/report/, agentcheck/baseline/, agentcheck/review/ |
Reporting, CI gating, human decisions on findings. |
agentcheck/regression/ |
Run-to-run behavioral comparison over stored artifacts. Executes nothing. |
agentcheck/gate.py |
The CI decision: runs the suite, compares the baseline, and answers whether a change blocks the build. Orchestrates the above; decides no verdicts of its own. |
agentcheck/identity.py |
Portable target identity and its bounded legacy compatibility path. |
agentcheck/redaction.py, agentcheck/privacy.py |
Credential redaction for artifacts and logs. |
agentcheck/cli.py |
The agentcheck command. |
spikes/environment_containment/ |
Repository-only, provider-neutral research contracts. Control metadata stays outside its minimal target leaves and never ships in distributions. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 131 lines · 1,617 tokens per session scan A aad7113d5e40
AgentCheck AGENTS.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository WaseemGhanem98/AgentCheck (72 stars, last pushed 28d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 1,617 tokens to every session, about $0.0065 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other instructions, from other repositories
vscode buildNext.instructions.md
Working notes and architecture documentation for the new esbuild-based build system in build/next. Use when making changes to the new build pipeline (transpile/bundle commands, NLS plugin, source-map handling, resource copying, or self-hosting watch tasks).
next.js AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for vercel/next.js, covering next.js development guide, codebase structure, monorepo overview, core package: packages/next and other important packages.
vscode oss-third-party-notices.instructions.md
Instructions for microsoft/vscode, covering vs code oss third-party-notices pipeline, architecture, pipeline flow in ci, cache eligibility and rollout and applying the notice (cutover).
langchain AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for langchain-ai/langchain, covering global development guidelines for the langchain monorepo, corridor security analysis, project architecture and context, monorepo structure and development tools & commands.
vscode copilot-instructions.md
Copilot instructions for microsoft/vscode, covering vs code copilot instructions, project overview, root folders, core architecture (src/ folder) and built-in extensions (extensions/ folder).
deno copilot-instructions.md
Copilot instructions for denoland/deno, covering deno development guide for github copilot, network access, high level overview, key directories and key files to understand first.