Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add instructions/ytubecoder/codex-in-claude/claude-mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ytubecoder/codex-in-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/ytubecoder/codex-in-claude/claude-md)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/ytubecoder/codex-in-claude/claude-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/ytubecoder/codex-in-claude/claude-md.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.02188 | $0.02188 |
| Opus 5 | $0.01094 | $0.01094 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00438 | $0.00438 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00219 | $0.00219 |
Grade A, and why
codex-in-claude CLAUDE.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 46 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
codex-in-claude
Two Claude Code skills backed by external CLI agents (Codex, Grok, Gemini via gemini-cli or Antigravity/agy), plus the bin/peon script:
skills/plan-check/SKILL.md— mediated plan review (opinions in). Read-only reviewers.skills/peon-poke/SKILL.md— farm implementation work out to worktree-isolated peons (labor out).bin/peonis the deterministic interface; the skill teaches workflow only.
This repo is the source of truth. Installed copies on this machine live in ~/.claude/skills/{plan-check,peon-poke}/ (that dir is its own git repo, no remote) and ~/.local/bin/peon — re-sync installed copies after editing here.
Invariants — plan-check
- Reviewers are independent: identical round-1 prompts; no reviewer sees another's output except a Claude-authored relay on a direct contradiction (escalation only).
- Plan content travels inside the prompt — reviewers work without repo access, read-only sandboxes.
- The skill never edits plan files.
codex exec resumehas NO-sflag — sandbox for resumed sessions goes via-c sandbox_mode=...(broke live 2026-07-29 on codex-cli 0.145.0).- Gemini reviews run
--approval-mode plan(read-only policy mode) from a dedicatedmktemp -ddir: gemini sessions are per-directory and resumed by recency only, so the private dir is what makes--resume latestunambiguous across rounds. - Antigravity (
agy) reviews run--mode plan --output-format json; captureconversation_idfrom the JSON for rounds 2+ (--conversation <id>). Never seat bothgeminiandagyin one council — same model family, no independence. - gemini-cli stopped serving consumer Google accounts (free/AI Pro/Ultra) on 2026-06-18 — "gemini" requests route to
agyunless the machine has an enterprise/API-key gemini setup.
Invariants — peon-poke
- Hub-and-spoke: all work products return to the orchestrator; peons never share state.
- Draft-until-reviewed: peon output stays on
peon/<slug>branches in$PEON_HOME/worktrees/; only explicitpeon merge(after review) lands it. Every merge gets exactly one review treatment — full-diff read (classic), the complete black-box gate set perdocs/BLACKBOX-ACCEPTANCE.md(peon check+ test audit + independent probes), or spot review (self-tested brief + foreman-run verify viacheck+ diffstat + load-bearing hunks only) — never none. - Evidence hierarchy: everything the peon writes (report prose, pasted test output) is generator-class self-reporting, advisory only; gates are computed foreman-side from git facts + foreman-run commands. Never chase a peon-reported test failure before reproducing via
peon check(forced-color env leakage alone has faked failures, live 2026-08-02). - Exit codes: 1 = usage/environment/provider error; 3 = peon contract violation, worktree + metadata preserved. The session id persists to meta BEFORE the contract gate, so poke/adopt still work after a tripped dispatch.
peon adopt <slug>is the sanctioned recovery for sandbox-blocked commits (work + PEON_REPORT.md on disk, uncommitted, exit 3): foreman-commits the lot on the peon branch. Refuses a clean worktree or missing report. Adoption is mechanics, NOT acceptance — review still decides the merge. Never hand-rollgit add/commitin a peon worktree.- Color-forcing env vars (
CLICOLOR_FORCE,FORCE_COLOR,CLICOLOR) are unset at the top ofbin/peon— Claude Code's Bash tool exports CLICOLOR_FORCE=1, which leaks forced ANSI into peon test runs and the verify gate, faking failures in text-matching helpers. - Merge subject truncation is char-safe via python — bash
printf '%.60s'counts bytes and cut a multibyte char mid-sequence (invalid UTF-8 merge subject, live 2026-08-02). peon check--allow/--verifyoverrides: one-off when a contract was recorded at dispatch; late-DECLARE the contract (persisted to meta, merge-enforced) when none was — otherwise a check-time verify would never bind the merge.- Acceptance contract in meta:
--allow(file-scope globs, fnmatch,*crosses/) and--verify(command) recorded at dispatch.peon checkexecutes them foreman-side and records the verify result against the branch tip sha;peon mergerefuses out-of-scope files and failed/stale/never-run verify (--uncheckedbypasses with a loud warning). Peon-pasted test output is advisory only — the foreman-run verify is the gate. peon reportusage line is parsed from logs already on disk (codex JSONL: cumulative totals, counter-drop = run boundary, run finals summed; agy: last usage dict per JSON doc, summed; grok/gemini: no counts →n/a). Self-reported, approximate, observability only — NEVER add a "savings" estimate: the counterfactual never ran and a fabricated metric would nudge farming-out of tasks where the method is net-negative.- Metadata is OUT of the worktree:
$PEON_HOME/meta/<slug>.json, atomically reserved (noclobber) — slugs are global identities. Nothing peon-related is ever written into the user's repo or worktree by the harness. - Contract gates after every provider run: commits since gate ref (dispatch: base; poke: pre-poke HEAD) + committed PEON_REPORT.md + clean worktree. Violations fail loudly and preserve the worktree.
bin/peonis the only interface — skills and agents never hand-roll worktree or provider incantations. bash-3.2-compatible; deps: git, python3, uuidgen. Never jq, nevercodex exec resume --last.- Grok headless can only COMMIT with
--always-approve(GROK_APPROVE=always, the live-locked default);--permission-mode auto/dontAskpermit file edits but block git-commit shell calls — the peon then trips the contract gate having "succeeded". AND: in linked worktrees grok's sandbox cannot write the main repo's.git/worktrees/gitdir at all (observed 3× live 2026-08-02, loops repo), so even--always-approvegrok exits 3 with work + report on disk — the healthy grok path is dispatch → exit 3 → review →peon adopt→ merge, with each poke round repeating exit 3 → adopt. The dispatch prompt carries the no-escape rule (never improvise remotes/.gitdirs around a blocked commit). - Gemini peons run
--approval-mode yolowith NO-s/--sandbox: a linked worktree's git dir lives under the main repo's.git/worktrees/, outside gemini's seatbelt project boundary, so a sandboxed peon could edit but never commit (grok-approve-class trap). Containment is the worktree + review. ⚠ Flag-semantics reasoning only (gemini-cli 0.53.0) — NOT live-verifiable on consumer accounts since the 2026-06-18 cutoff; verify before trusting on an enterprise setup. - Gemini has no id-addressed resume: per-directory session store, poke runs
--resume latestfrom the worktree cwd. Invariant: nothing but the harness ever runs gemini inside a peon worktree. agy(Antigravity) peons run--dangerously-skip-permissions --output-format json --print-timeout 30m, NO--sandbox(same worktree-git-dir reasoning as gemini).conversation_idis extracted fail-closed from the JSON (missing id orstatus != SUCCESSdies); poke resumes with--conversation <id>. The 30m print-timeout matters — agy's default is 5m, which would kill real dispatches mid-task. LIVE-LOCKED 2026-07-30 (agy 1.1.8): skip-permissions commits work; contract gate passes; resume keeps context.- agy can MINT A NEW conversation_id on resume (observed live 2026-07-30 — context carries over but the id rotates). The log accumulates one JSON doc per run;
extract_agy_conversationreads the LAST doc, andcmd_pokepersists the new head to meta before the contract gate. Never resume an older id from the chain — later pokes' context silently vanishes. mergestripsPEON_REPORT.mdonly when the merge target didn't already track it (review artifact, not product code).- Tests:
bash tests/peon.test.sh(fake provider + dry-run, deterministic, no provider CLIs needed). Run after anybin/peonchange.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 46 lines · 2,188 tokens per session scan A 7e8f0cbd4050
codex-in-claude CLAUDE.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository ytubecoder/codex-in-claude (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 2,188 tokens to every session, about $0.0109 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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