Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
/plugin marketplace add karanb192/bouncernpx agentmods add plugins/karanb192/bouncer/claudegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/karanb192/bouncerGrade C, and why
bouncer scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
"description": "A one-file PreToolUse door-guard that bounces destructive Bash commands (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, curl|sh, force-push, device wipes) before they run. Blocks 45/45 known footguns, 0 false positives.", Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
"description": "A one-file PreToolUse door-guard that bounces destructive Bash commands (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, curl|sh, force-push, device wipes) before they run. Blocks 45/45 known footguns, 0 false positives.", What it actually says
{
"name": "bouncer",
"version": "1.0.1",
"description": "A one-file PreToolUse door-guard that bounces destructive Bash commands (rm -rf, DROP TABLE, curl|sh, force-push, device wipes) before they run. Blocks 45/45 known footguns, 0 false positives.",
"author": {
"name": "Karan Bansal",
"url": "https://github.com/karanb192"
},
"homepage": "https://github.com/karanb192/bouncer",
"license": "MIT",
"keywords": [
"security",
"safety",
"hooks",
"guardrails",
"claude-code",
"pretooluse"
],
"hooks": "./hooks/hooks.json"
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 21 lines scan C a38aa8659e71
bouncer is a plugin published in the GitHub repository karanb192/bouncer (5 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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