macos-permissions

macos-permissions is a plugin for Claude Code from terrylica/cc-skills. Its manifest loads nothing; the 2 skills it bundles cost 357 tokens per session together, scanned A, original, MIT.

A macOS administration plugin for auditing and controlling what applications can access, control, or keep running after a restart. It covers privacy permissions and startup mechanisms, including entries that may remain after an app is uninstalled.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to inspect Mac privacy grants, startup services, extensions, helpers, login components, network listeners, and firewall state.
Why use it?
macOS stores access approvals in several places, and its normal settings may not show every one. A broader audit can reveal leftover permissions and background components that ordinary checks miss.

Plugin for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: a Claude Code plugin manifest.

Good fit Use it to inspect Mac privacy grants, startup services, extensions, helpers, login components, network listeners, and firewall state.

Compare 6 plugins from other repositories ↓
Install in Claude Code
/plugin marketplace add terrylica/cc-skills
/plugin install macos-permissions
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/terrylica/cc-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for macos-permissions

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for macos-permissions

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/plugins/terrylica/cc-skills/macos-permissions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session not measured What this adds to a session before it is invoked.
When invoked not measured The manifest loads nothing itself; its 2 skills cost 357 tokens a session between them.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Security

Grade A, and why

macos-permissions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude-plugin/marketplace.json#macos-permissions · 26 lines

What it actually says

{
  "name": "macos-permissions",
  "description": "Audit and control what software on a Mac can see, drive and outlive a reboot. TCC privacy grants across all ~40 services and all three permission stores (system, user, and the Sequoia screen-capture plist tccutil cannot reach), including grants stranded by uninstalled apps that macOS never garbage-collects. Plus full persistence enumeration: launchd with Label-vs-filename detection, BTM, system extensions, audio HAL plug-ins, login-chain plugins, helpers, kexts, sockets and firewall state.",
  "version": "33.16.0",
  "source": "./plugins/macos-permissions",
  "category": "utilities",
  "author": {
    "name": "terrylica",
    "url": "https://github.com/terrylica"
  },
  "keywords": [
    "macos",
    "tcc",
    "privacy",
    "permissions",
    "accessibility",
    "screen-recording",
    "full-disk-access",
    "persistence",
    "launchd",
    "security",
    "uninstall",
    "remote-access"
  ],
  "strict": false
}
Contents

What it installs

The manifest is a name and a version. 2 skills travel with it, and installing the plugin installs all of them — 357 tokens a session between them. Each is measured on its own page, and each can be installed alone.

Files

What ships with it

2 files beside marketplace.json#macos-permissions in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. today Changed 52b9ad29678e
  2. 2d ago Changed 4dc7aca5558b
  3. 7d ago Changed abb1f782029a
  4. 8d ago Changed fdde9d5a7c1c
  5. 9d ago Changed c85e37dde31b
  6. 10d ago Changed 3ad38e886ab8
  7. 11d ago Changed e57913788806
  8. 12d ago Changed 8411c7bc0e08
  9. 13d ago Changed 3d487c315a0b
  10. 14d ago First seen · 26 lines scan A 37009bebf2a4

Subscribe to this mod's changes

macos-permissions is a plugin published in the GitHub repository terrylica/cc-skills (0 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-21.