Atlassian Forge Skills supports Atlassian Forge, a platform for building and deploying apps that extend products such as Jira and Confluence. Its skills and MCP-backed tools help coding agents create Forge apps, review them before deployment, optimize usage, troubleshoot failures, and work with Forge APIs and the Atlassian Design System.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atlassian/forge-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-egress-remotes)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-egress-remotes"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-egress-remotes/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-egress-remotes"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-egress-remotes.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00467 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00234 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00093 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00047 |
Grade A, and why
_index-egress-remotes scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
- Scope: External network permissions, remote configurations, egress controls, and data exfiltration risks.
- Priority: External integrations are a common attack surface for SSRF and data leakage.
Key Forge Egress/Remote Risks
- Wildcard external permissions: Using
*or overly broad wildcards inpermissions.external.fetch. - Data egress via window.location: Custom UI can redirect with sensitive data in URL parameters.
- Undeclared external domains: Outbound calls to domains not in manifest permissions.
- Remote backend trust: Trusting external remotes without proper authentication/validation.
- SSRF via user-controlled URLs: Building fetch URLs from untrusted input.
Subrules
- Wildcard External Permissions →
@forge-egress-remotes/wildcard-permissions.mdc - Data Egress via Redirects →
@forge-egress-remotes/data-egress-redirects.mdc
Detection Heuristics
- Check manifest
permissions.external.fetchfor wildcards or overly broad patterns. - Search for
window.location,location.href,location.assign()with dynamic URLs containing query params. - Trace fetch/request calls to verify destinations match declared permissions.
- Review remote configurations for authentication and data residency declarations.
Manifest Permission Patterns
# INSECURE - overly broad
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.example.com' # Wildcard subdomain risk
- '*' # Never acceptable
# SECURE - explicit domains
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- 'api.example.com'
- 'auth.example.com'
CWE References
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery
- CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary
- CWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy
- CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 60 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A d936027a51ed
_index-egress-remotes is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository atlassian/forge-skills (22 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 467 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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