Atlassian Forge Skills supports Atlassian Forge, a platform for building and deploying apps that extend products such as Jira and Confluence. Its skills and MCP-backed tools help coding agents create Forge apps, review them before deployment, optimize usage, troubleshoot failures, and work with Forge APIs and the Atlassian Design System.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atlassian/forge-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-rovo-agents)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-rovo-agents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-rovo-agents.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00643 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00321 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00129 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00064 |
Grade A, and why
_index-rovo-agents scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
- Scope: Security considerations specific to Forge Rovo agents, actions, and LLM-driven functionality.
- Priority: Emerging attack surface with unique privilege escalation and injection risks.
Key Forge Rovo Agent Risks
- A4J running with elevated privileges: Agents executing actions with asApp() without proper authorization checks.
- Known AuthZ gap (AGRC-15320): Agents can execute actions with higher privileges than intended.
- LLM-generated URL risks: SSRF and data egress when agents render or fetch LLM-generated URLs.
- Browser context consumption: Agents consuming user-controlled browser context URLs.
- Cross-site/cross-product access: Custom agents providing unintended access across products.
- App access rules bypass: Forge agents may not respect app access restriction rules.
Subrules
- Agent Privilege Escalation →
@forge-rovo-agents/agent-privilege-escalation.mdc - LLM Output Injection →
@forge-rovo-agents/llm-output-injection.mdc
- Prefer Using Function Context Object →
@forge-authn-authz/prefer-context-authz.mdc- Use this rule if any agents have declared
actionskeys undermodules.rovo:agententries in their manifest
- Use this rule if any agents have declared
Detection Heuristics
- Identify Rovo action modules in manifest and their associated functions.
- Check for
asApp()usage in agent actions without explicit permission validation. - Look for URL handling from LLM outputs without validation.
- Review agent configurations for cross-product scope declarations.
Rovo-Specific Caveats
- Rovo Forge Actions documentation lacks guidance on asUser vs asApp (unlike regular Forge Actions).
- Authorization checks must happen before Forge function invocation; Convo AI should not allow unauthorized actions on restricted content.
- Browser context URLs are user-controlled and must not be trusted.
Agent Authorization Pattern
// INSECURE - asApp without checks
export async function agentAction(payload) {
const api = asApp();
await api.requestJira(route`/rest/api/3/issue/${payload.issueId}`);
}
// SECURE - verify permissions first
export async function agentAction(payload, context) {
// Verify the requesting user has permission
const hasPermission = await checkUserPermission(context.accountId, payload.issueId);
if (!hasPermission) {
throw new Error('Unauthorized');
}
const api = asApp();
await api.requestJira(route`/rest/api/3/issue/${payload.issueId}`);
}
CWE References
- CWE-862: Missing Authorization
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery
- CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (Injection)
- CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 70 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 7605c28443a9
_index-rovo-agents is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository atlassian/forge-skills (21 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 643 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
ponytail
Ponytail, lazy senior dev mode. Always pick the simplest solution that works.
angular-20
This rule provides comprehensive best practices and coding standards for Angular development, focusing on modern TypeScript, standalone components, signals, and performance optimizations.
dev-standard
Apache Superset development standards and guidelines for Cursor IDE.
cli-error-handling
CLI command error handling patterns.
prefer-direct-imports-over-module-mocks
Prefer extracting a testable core over vi.mock / vi.resetModules when unit tests need to reach production logic entangled with config, env, or singletons.
control-plane-descriptors
Control plane descriptor and instance implementation patterns.