_index-webtrigger-entrypoints

A security rules index for Forge entrypoints, the functions and URLs through which Atlassian Forge apps receive web requests, scheduled jobs, or events.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to find rules for securing web triggers and reviewing authentication, request validation, event data, and scheduled handlers.
Why use it?
It highlights that web triggers are usually unauthenticated and that request validation, replay protection, and rate limiting must be handled by the app.

Cursor rule

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/atlassian/forge-skills/_index-webtrigger-entrypoints
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atlassian/forge-skills
Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 516 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.00516
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00258
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00103
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00052

Measured 2d ago against content hash a455de52a448, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

_index-webtrigger-entrypoints scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/forge-security-review/assets/security-rules/forge-webtrigger-entrypoints/_index-webtrigger-entrypoints.mdc · 65 lines

What it actually says

  • Scope: Web triggers, scheduled triggers, event handlers, and other externally-accessible Forge entrypoints.
  • Priority: Web triggers are unauthenticated URLs by default; major attack surface.

Key Forge Entrypoint Risks

  • No built-in web trigger authentication: Forge does not provide authentication for web triggers; apps must implement their own.
  • Missing request validation: No signature verification, replay protection, or integrity checks.
  • Abuse protection gaps: No built-in rate limiting or throttling for web triggers.
  • Event handler trust: Assuming events come from trusted sources without validation.
  • Scheduled trigger data handling: Processing external data fetched by scheduled handlers.

Subrules

  • Web Trigger Security → @forge-webtrigger-entrypoints/webtrigger-security.mdc

Detection Heuristics

  • Identify all webtrigger modules in manifest.yml.
  • Check handler functions for authentication header validation (e.g., HMAC, shared secret).
  • Look for timestamp/nonce validation for replay protection.
  • Review event handlers for input validation before processing.

Web Trigger Security Patterns

// INSECURE - no authentication
export async function handler(request) {
  const body = JSON.parse(request.body);
  await processData(body);  // Directly processing untrusted input
  return { statusCode: 200 };
}

// SECURE - with authentication
export async function handler(request) {
  const signature = request.headers['x-signature'];
  const timestamp = request.headers['x-timestamp'];
  
  if (!verifySignature(request.body, signature, SECRET)) {
    return { statusCode: 401, body: 'Unauthorized' };
  }
  if (isReplayAttack(timestamp)) {
    return { statusCode: 400, body: 'Request expired' };
  }
  // Process validated request
}

CWE References

  • CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
  • CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery
  • CWE-799: Improper Control of Interaction Frequency
  • CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 65 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a455de52a448

Subscribe to this mod's changes

_index-webtrigger-entrypoints is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository atlassian/forge-skills (20 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 516 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.