Atlassian Forge Skills supports Atlassian Forge, a platform for building and deploying apps that extend products such as Jira and Confluence. Its skills and MCP-backed tools help coding agents create Forge apps, review them before deployment, optimize usage, troubleshoot failures, and work with Forge APIs and the Atlassian Design System.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atlassian/forge-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00011 | $0.01030 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00515 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00206 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00103 |
Grade A, and why
wildcard-permissions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 166 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Context
- Wildcard patterns in
permissions.external.fetchcan expose apps to SSRF, data exfiltration, and unintended external communications. Explicit domain allowlists are required. - Related CWE: CWE-942 (Permissive Cross-domain Policy), CWE-918 (SSRF).
- Reference: Internal VULN Guide to Insecure Wildcard Remotes.
Scope & Signals
- Manifest locations:
permissions.external.fetch.backendpermissions.external.fetch.clientremotesconfiguration
- Dangerous patterns:
*- Allows any domain (never acceptable)*.example.com- Subdomain wildcard (attacker can register subdomains)*.*.example.com- Multi-level wildcard- Overly broad TLDs:
*.com,*.io
Vulnerable Patterns
# CRITICAL - Allows any external domain
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*'
# HIGH - Subdomain wildcard exploitation
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.example.com'
# Attacker registers: malicious.example.com (if possible)
# Or exploits: user-controlled.example.com subdomain
# HIGH - Multiple wildcards
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.*.example.com'
# MEDIUM - Broad service wildcards
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.amazonaws.com' # Too broad - includes S3, EC2 metadata, etc.
- '*.cloudfront.net'
# RISKY - Development/staging patterns in production
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.dev.example.com'
- 'localhost:*'
Secure Patterns
# SECURE - Explicit domain allowlist
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- 'api.example.com'
- 'auth.example.com'
- 'webhooks.example.com'
# SECURE - Specific subdomains
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- 'api.prod.example.com'
- 'api.eu.example.com'
- 'api.us.example.com'
# SECURE - HTTPS only (implicit in Forge, but verify)
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- 'https://api.example.com'
Valid Domain Format Reference
Per Forge documentation, valid domain formats:
example.com- Exact domainapi.example.com- Exact subdomain*.example.com- Wildcard subdomain (use with caution)example.com:8080- With port- Cannot use paths in domain specifications
Detection Checklist
- Parse manifest.yml for
permissions.external.fetch. - Flag any
*(bare wildcard) entries. - Flag
*.domain.compatterns and assess subdomain control risk. - Check for overly broad cloud provider wildcards.
- Verify all declared domains are necessary for app functionality.
- Look for development/localhost patterns.
- Review
remotessection for similar issues.
Risk Assessment
| Pattern | Risk Level | Concern |
|---|---|---|
* |
Critical | Unrestricted egress |
*.example.com |
High | Subdomain takeover/registration |
*.amazonaws.com |
High | Cloud metadata, internal services |
*.cloudflare.com |
Medium | May include untrusted user content |
api.example.com |
Low | Explicit, controlled |
Subdomain Takeover Considerations
# If using wildcard, assess:
# 1. Can anyone register subdomains on this domain?
# 2. Are there dangling DNS records?
# 3. Are there user-controlled subdomain patterns?
# Example vulnerable scenario:
permissions:
external:
fetch:
backend:
- '*.github.io' # Anyone can create [username].github.io
PoC / Test Leads
- Attempt requests to unintended domains within wildcard scope.
- Test subdomain patterns with attacker-controlled subdomains.
- Verify if declared but unused domains can be removed.
- Test SSRF to cloud metadata endpoints if cloud wildcards present.
Remediation Guidance (advisory)
- Replace wildcards with explicit domain lists.
- Audit all external domains for necessity.
- If subdomain wildcard required, ensure domain registrar controls all subdomains.
- Remove development/localhost patterns from production manifests.
- Implement request-time validation in addition to manifest controls.
- Consider using Forge External Auth for authenticated external services.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 166 lines · 11 tokens per session scan A f0d62d5e2828
wildcard-permissions is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository atlassian/forge-skills (21 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 1,030 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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