wildcard-permissions

wildcard-permissions is a cursor rule for Cursor from atlassian/forge-skills. It costs 11 tokens per session (1,030 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A security rule for Atlassian Forge app permissions, which control which outside websites an app may contact. It detects wildcard entries that allow access to any domain or to overly broad groups of subdomains.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps review backend and browser network permissions, remote definitions, and external fetch settings for entries such as * or broad subdomain patterns.
Why use it?
Broad permissions can let an app send requests to unintended websites, creating risks such as server-side request forgery, data theft, or unwanted communication. Specific approved domains limit that exposure.

Cursor rule for Cursor ✓ vendor

Written for Cursor: a Cursor rule (.mdc).

Good fit It helps review backend and browser network permissions, remote definitions, and external fetch settings for entries such as * or broad subdomain patterns.

Compare 6 cursor rules from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions
About the project

Atlassian Forge Skills supports Atlassian Forge, a platform for building and deploying apps that extend products such as Jira and Confluence. Its skills and MCP-backed tools help coding agents create Forge apps, review them before deployment, optimize usage, troubleshoot failures, and work with Forge APIs and the Atlassian Design System.

atlassian/forge-skills · 21 stars · on GitHub · developer.atlassian.com

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/atlassian/forge-skills

Made for: Cursor.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for wildcard-permissions

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/atlassian/forge-skills/wildcard-permissions.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 11 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,030 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00011 $0.01030
Opus 5 $0.00005 $0.00515
Sonnet 5 $0.00002 $0.00206
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00103

Measured 8d ago against content hash f0d62d5e2828, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

wildcard-permissions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/forge-security-review/assets/security-rules/forge-egress-remotes/wildcard-permissions.mdc · 166 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 166 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Context

  • Wildcard patterns in permissions.external.fetch can expose apps to SSRF, data exfiltration, and unintended external communications. Explicit domain allowlists are required.
  • Related CWE: CWE-942 (Permissive Cross-domain Policy), CWE-918 (SSRF).
  • Reference: Internal VULN Guide to Insecure Wildcard Remotes.

Scope & Signals

  • Manifest locations:
    • permissions.external.fetch.backend
    • permissions.external.fetch.client
    • remotes configuration
  • Dangerous patterns:
    • * - Allows any domain (never acceptable)
    • *.example.com - Subdomain wildcard (attacker can register subdomains)
    • *.*.example.com - Multi-level wildcard
    • Overly broad TLDs: *.com, *.io

Vulnerable Patterns

# CRITICAL - Allows any external domain
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*'

# HIGH - Subdomain wildcard exploitation
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*.example.com'
# Attacker registers: malicious.example.com (if possible)
# Or exploits: user-controlled.example.com subdomain

# HIGH - Multiple wildcards
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*.*.example.com'

# MEDIUM - Broad service wildcards
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*.amazonaws.com'  # Too broad - includes S3, EC2 metadata, etc.
        - '*.cloudfront.net'

# RISKY - Development/staging patterns in production
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*.dev.example.com'
        - 'localhost:*'

Secure Patterns

# SECURE - Explicit domain allowlist
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - 'api.example.com'
        - 'auth.example.com'
        - 'webhooks.example.com'

# SECURE - Specific subdomains
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - 'api.prod.example.com'
        - 'api.eu.example.com'
        - 'api.us.example.com'

# SECURE - HTTPS only (implicit in Forge, but verify)
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - 'https://api.example.com'

Valid Domain Format Reference

Per Forge documentation, valid domain formats:

  • example.com - Exact domain
  • api.example.com - Exact subdomain
  • *.example.com - Wildcard subdomain (use with caution)
  • example.com:8080 - With port
  • Cannot use paths in domain specifications

Detection Checklist

  • Parse manifest.yml for permissions.external.fetch.
  • Flag any * (bare wildcard) entries.
  • Flag *.domain.com patterns and assess subdomain control risk.
  • Check for overly broad cloud provider wildcards.
  • Verify all declared domains are necessary for app functionality.
  • Look for development/localhost patterns.
  • Review remotes section for similar issues.

Risk Assessment

Pattern Risk Level Concern
* Critical Unrestricted egress
*.example.com High Subdomain takeover/registration
*.amazonaws.com High Cloud metadata, internal services
*.cloudflare.com Medium May include untrusted user content
api.example.com Low Explicit, controlled

Subdomain Takeover Considerations

# If using wildcard, assess:
# 1. Can anyone register subdomains on this domain?
# 2. Are there dangling DNS records?
# 3. Are there user-controlled subdomain patterns?

# Example vulnerable scenario:
permissions:
  external:
    fetch:
      backend:
        - '*.github.io'  # Anyone can create [username].github.io

PoC / Test Leads

  • Attempt requests to unintended domains within wildcard scope.
  • Test subdomain patterns with attacker-controlled subdomains.
  • Verify if declared but unused domains can be removed.
  • Test SSRF to cloud metadata endpoints if cloud wildcards present.

Remediation Guidance (advisory)

  • Replace wildcards with explicit domain lists.
  • Audit all external domains for necessity.
  • If subdomain wildcard required, ensure domain registrar controls all subdomains.
  • Remove development/localhost patterns from production manifests.
  • Implement request-time validation in addition to manifest controls.
  • Consider using Forge External Auth for authenticated external services.

Read the full file on GitHub · 166 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 8d ago First seen · 166 lines · 11 tokens per session scan A f0d62d5e2828

Subscribe to this mod's changes

wildcard-permissions is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository atlassian/forge-skills (21 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 1,030 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.