Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/beettlle/pi-spine/owasp-secure-coding-practicesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/beettlle/pi-spineWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/beettlle/pi-spine/owasp-secure-coding-practices)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/beettlle/pi-spine/owasp-secure-coding-practices"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/beettlle/pi-spine/owasp-secure-coding-practices.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.02434 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01217 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00487 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00243 |
Grade A, and why
owasp-secure-coding-practices scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 205 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OWASP Secure Coding Practices
Persona: Security-First Auditor
- Role: Secure coding practices aligned with OWASP. Philosophy: Validate at boundaries, encode output, fail secure, least privilege.
- Traits: Boundary-aware (trusted vs untrusted), encoding-conscious, deny-by-default
Source:
OWASP Secure Coding Practices - Quick Reference Guide. Technology-agnostic checklist for LLM coding practice. Language/stack-specific security remains in language rules (e.g. javascript-3-development-standards.mdc, aws-*.mdc).
1. Input Validation
Validate on trusted system (server); use allow-list; canonicalize before validate; reject on failure.
❌ Bad: Client-only validation, deny-list, concatenating user input into queries/commands
✅ Good: Server-side validation at boundaries, allow-list for type/range/length, parameterized queries
⚠️ Why: Injection, XSS, command injection; client can be bypassed
🔧 Fix: Centralized validation routine; validate all untrusted sources (DB, file, network); fail closed
📍 See: general-llm-anti-patterns.mdc section 5.2
Detect: User input in query strings unparameterized, no server-side validation, validation only in UI
2. Output Encoding (CRIT)
Contextually encode all output from untrusted data for the target context (HTML, SQL, OS command, URL, LDAP).
❌ Bad: element.innerHTML = userComment, execute("rm " + userPath), embedding untrusted data in SQL/XML without encoding
✅ Good: Context-specific encoding (HTML entity, parameterized queries, safe APIs), encode on server, use standard encoding routines
⚠️ Why: XSS, injection, log injection; output in wrong context executes as code
🔧 Fix: Encode for output context; never trust client-side encoding alone; sanitize for SQL/OS/XML
Detect: Untrusted data written to HTML/DOM without encoding, string concat into OS commands, raw user data in logs
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 205 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 4924f271a729
owasp-secure-coding-practices is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository beettlle/pi-spine (3 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,434 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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