Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-codingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/ml-secure-no-railguard-available)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/ml-secure-no-railguard-available"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/ml-secure-no-railguard-available.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00837 | $0.00837 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00418 | $0.00418 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00167 | $0.00167 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00084 | $0.00084 |
Grade A, and why
ml-secure-no-railguard-available scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
R: Risk First
- The goal is to reduce risk exposure in machine learning pipelines by securing data ingestion, model checkpoint loading, dependency handling, and inference logic.
- AI-generated ML code should not trust unknown data sources or model files without validation.
- The LLM must ensure safety against insecure serialization, poisoning, and unsafe dynamic behavior.
A: Attached Constraints
- Never use
pickle.load()ortorch.load()on files from untrusted sources. - Never use
eval()orexec()to dynamically interpret model code, formulas, or input. - Never suppress exceptions silently (
try/except: pass). - Avoid using untyped data transformations or outputs.
- Do not log raw inputs from end users (can include PII).
I: Interpretative Framing
- Treat all input data (CSV, JSON, NumPy, HuggingFace datasets) as potentially malformed or poisoned unless explicitly validated.
- If loading a model checkpoint, assume the file may have been tampered with.
- When generating inference code, assume it may be deployed in production with untrusted input.
L: Local Defaults
- Use
joblibortorch.load()only on trusted, versioned model paths - Prefer
torch.save(model.state_dict())for safe model export; avoid full object serialization - Use Pydantic or Marshmallow schemas for preprocessing configs and inference input validation
- Use
loggingfor monitoring; avoidprint()and never log rawrequest.body - Default to strict file permissions (
r, norb+)
G: Generative Path Checks
- When generating model loading logic:
- Confirm source is trusted or version-controlled
- Avoid deserializing entire objects unless safe
- Use checksum or hash verification if relevant
- When preprocessing data:
- Validate data structure (rows, types, shape)
- Use
try/exceptwith logging for failed transforms
- When handling input for inference:
- Validate schema
- Normalize securely
- Avoid leaking model internals in output
U: Uncertainty Disclosure
- If unsure about input format, file source, or serialization method, generate a comment: “Verify this file path is trusted before deserializing model.”
- If unsure about preprocessing correctness, generate: “Review schema/shape assumptions before transforming user input.”
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 86 lines · 837 tokens per session scan A 575bfe0def9b
ml-secure-no-railguard-available is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding (13 stars, last pushed 1y ago), licensed MIT. It adds 837 tokens to every session, about $0.0042 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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