terraform-secure-no-railguard-available

terraform-secure-no-railguard-available is a cursor rule for Cursor from brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding. It costs 695 tokens per session, scanned A, original, MIT.

A set of security rules for Terraform, a tool that describes and provisions cloud infrastructure as code. It requires protected secrets, restricted permissions, validated inputs, private-by-default resources, and encryption where applicable.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when creating or reviewing Terraform modules, cloud resources, IAM policies, state storage, network access, and deployment settings.
Why use it?
It helps prevent common infrastructure mistakes such as exposed services, hardcoded credentials, broad access rights, and unencrypted data.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Written for Cursor: installed under .cursor/.

Good fit Use it when creating or reviewing Terraform modules, cloud resources, IAM policies, state storage, network access, and deployment settings.

Compare 6 cursor rules from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding

Made for: Cursor.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for terraform-secure-no-railguard-available

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for terraform-secure-no-railguard-available

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 695 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 695 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00695 $0.00695
Opus 5 $0.00347 $0.00347
Sonnet 5 $0.00139 $0.00139
Haiku 4.5 $0.00069 $0.00069

Measured 10d ago against content hash e4ddebdbfe3c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

terraform-secure-no-railguard-available scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/terraform-secure-no-railguard-available.mdc · 72 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

R: Risk First

  • Terraform governs critical cloud infrastructure. Misconfigurations or insecure defaults can expose sensitive data, escalate privileges, or open up attack vectors.
  • This rule ensures resources are validated, encrypted, access-scoped, and secrets handled securely.
  • Secure defaults must apply even when user prompts are vague or casually phrased.

A: Attached Constraints

  • Do not hardcode secrets, tokens, passwords, or sensitive IDs.
  • Do not use wildcard IAM permissions (*) in actions or resources.
  • Do not expose resources publicly (0.0.0.0/0, http, public-read) unless explicitly justified.
  • Do not use loosely typed or unvalidated inputs.
  • Use sensitive = true for outputs with secrets.
  • Enforce encryption at rest and in transit on all applicable resources.

I: Interpretative Framing

  • Treat all Terraform prompts as production-relevant unless explicitly stated otherwise.
  • If no backend, region, or permission scope is specified, default to the most secure option.
  • Avoid assumptions like "temporary" or "demo" deployments — all code is security-critical.

L: Local Defaults

  • Default to remote state with locking and encryption (e.g., S3 + DynamoDB).
  • Assume KMS encryption where available.
  • Assume TLS is always enabled for network-facing services.
  • Separate environments via workspaces or folder structure.
  • Use pinned versions for all providers and modules (never latest).

G: Generative Path Checks

  1. Is the input validated (type + constraints)?
  2. Are secrets handled via vault/env and outputs marked sensitive?
  3. Is encryption configured at rest and in transit?
  4. Are IAM policies tightly scoped?
  5. Is state secured remotely?
  6. Does the config isolate environments?
  7. Are default ports or exposures justified?

U: Uncertainty Disclosure

  • If unsure whether a resource should be public or private, default to private.
  • If permissions seem too broad or unclear, ask the user for scope.
  • When encryption, validation, or backend config is missing, inject secure defaults with explanatory comments.

Read the full file on GitHub · 72 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 10d ago First seen · 72 lines · 695 tokens per session scan A e4ddebdbfe3c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

terraform-secure-no-railguard-available is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository brighton-labs/railguard-cursor-coding (13 stars, last pushed 1y ago), licensed MIT. It adds 695 tokens to every session, about $0.0035 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.