Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/agent-supply-chain-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/agent-supply-chain-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/agent-supply-chain-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/agent-supply-chain-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/agent-supply-chain-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00221 | $0.06561 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00088 | $0.02624 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00044 | $0.01312 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00656 |
Grade B, and why
agent-supply-chain-audit scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
| Credential reads | E2, E3, PE3 | `rg -n -i '\.ssh/\|id_(rsa\|ed25519)\|\.aws/credentials\|\.netrc\|\.npmrc\|printenv\|process\.env\|os\.environ' $T` | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
| Claude Code | `CLAUDE.md`, `CLAUDE.local.md`, `~/.claude/CLAUDE.md` | `.claude/skills`, `~/.claude/skills`, `.claude/commands`, `.claude/agents`, `~/.claude/plugins/`, `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` + `marketplace.json` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
description: "Audit the extensions AI coding agents load and trust (skills, plugins, marketplaces, hooks, settings, MCP servers, and instruction files like CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursor/rules and copilot-instr How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 316 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Agent Supply-Chain Audit — Skills, Plugins, Hooks, MCP Servers, Instruction Files
Coding agents now load third-party code and third-party instructions with the developer's full privileges: a skill is
prose the model obeys, a hook is a shell command that runs on every prompt, an MCP server is a process launched from
whatever npx resolves today. NVIDIA's SkillSpector write-up cites Liu et al. (2026): of 31,132 public skills analysed,
26.1% had a vulnerability and 5.2% looked malicious. Nobody reviews these the way they review a dependency.
This skill inventories everything the user's agents load, reads it for concealed or hostile behaviour, checks what runs automatically and how it's pinned, and returns a per-item verdict. It never executes, installs, edits, or removes the items it audits.
Cross-references: prompt-injection for the same hidden-instruction and tool-poisoning checks applied to the user's
application (RAG corpora, system prompts, the MCP servers the app exposes); secrets-audit for tokens sitting in MCP
env blocks, agent settings, and session transcripts; dependency-audit for the npm / PyPI packages behind MCP servers
and bundled scripts; ai-risk-management for where agent tooling sits in the org's AI inventory; incident-triage
when a malicious item has already run; personal-opsec for the operator's own machine and accounts around the agent.
Step 0 — Authorization and scope
- Audit the user's own machine, repos, and the items they're considering installing. User-level folders (
~/.claude,~/.codex, …) belong to the person at the keyboard; don't audit another user's home or a shared host without the owner's say-so. - Agree the scope: project (this repo), user (home-directory config), managed (org policy files), or a candidate (a skill / plugin / server the user hasn't installed yet — have them clone it to a scratch directory; don't install it to look at it).
- Read-only. Config files hold tokens: when a match contains a secret, report the file and key name, redact the value
to prefix + last 4, and hand it to
secrets-audit. Don't paste secret values into the conversation. - Never run an item to see what it does (no launching MCP servers, no running bundled scripts or hook commands). Where
dynamic evidence is needed, write the
validation_planfor the user to run in a sandbox.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 316 lines · 221 tokens per session scan B cf260911b358
agent-supply-chain-audit is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills (435 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 221 tokens to every session and 6,561 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (reaches for credential files, reads agent configuration directories, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-27.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
ponytail
Ponytail, lazy senior dev mode. Always pick the simplest solution that works.
angular-20
This rule provides comprehensive best practices and coding standards for Angular development, focusing on modern TypeScript, standalone components, signals, and performance optimizations.
dev-standard
Apache Superset development standards and guidelines for Cursor IDE.
control-plane-descriptors
Control plane descriptor and instance implementation patterns.
family-instance-domain-actions
Family instance domain action implementation patterns.
no-family-vocabulary-in-framework
The framework domain (packages/1-framework) carries no family- or target-specific vocabulary — types, fields, hooks, or strategy values — and, outside the CLI and the PSL parser's grammar names, no Prisma version name before 8. Enforced by the no-family-vocabulary Biome plugin plus the lint:ratchets ratchet.