Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/iam-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/iam-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/iam-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/iam-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/iam-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00173 | $0.02924 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00086 | $0.01462 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00035 | $0.00585 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00292 |
Grade A, and why
iam-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 174 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
IAM Audit — Identity & Access Management Review and Design
Cover the identity and access layer end-to-end: audit existing setup, design from scratch, plan migrations, and codify the patterns most teams get wrong. This is the consultant-style skill — not just "what's misconfigured" but "what should this look like."
Three modes — pick the one that matches the engagement:
- Audit — review what's already deployed, find privilege creep and gaps
- Design — greenfield IAM for a new project or new identity provider
- Migrate — consolidate multiple identity providers, federate access, move to SSO
Cross-references: cloud-audit for the cloud-provider audit (broader than IAM), container-audit for K8s RBAC and ServiceAccounts (orchestration-layer identity).
Mode 1 — Audit existing IAM
Cloud provider IAM
AWS:
- IAM users with console access — should be zero in mature setups (use SSO/Identity Center)
- IAM users with permanent access keys — every one is a credential rotation problem; replace with role assumption via SSO or IAM Roles Anywhere
- Permissions boundaries set on every role that can create roles (prevents privilege escalation via
iam:CreateRole+iam:AttachRolePolicy) AdministratorAccesspolicy attachments — flag every one and justify- Wildcard
Action: "*"orResource: "*"outside of break-glass roles - Cross-account trust policies —
Principal: { AWS: "*" }is open to the world; should be specific account IDs with optionalaws:PrincipalOrgIDcondition - IMDSv2 enforced —
MetadataOptions.HttpTokens: requiredon every EC2 launch template - Service-linked roles audited — they bypass normal restrictions
- Run:
aws accessanalyzer list-findings,aws iam generate-credential-report,aws iam get-account-authorization-details
GCP:
roles/ownerandroles/editorare too broad — replace with custom roles or fine-grainedroles/*Admin- Service account keys downloaded (
projects.serviceAccounts.keys.create) — should be zero; use Workload Identity Federation - Service accounts with
iam.serviceAccountTokenCreatoron themselves = self-impersonation = privilege escalation - Org-level vs project-level bindings — over-scoped bindings at the org level are silent privilege grants to every project
allUsers/allAuthenticatedUsersbindings on any sensitive resource- Run:
gcloud asset analyze-iam-policy,gcloud policy-intelligence query-activity, Recommender API
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 174 lines · 173 tokens per session scan A 8f6de79039a7
iam-audit is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills (387 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 173 tokens to every session and 2,924 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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