Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/secrets-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/secrets-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/secrets-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/secrets-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills/secrets-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00140 | $0.05960 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00056 | $0.02384 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.01192 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00596 |
Grade B, and why
secrets-audit scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
| `.claude/settings.json`, `.claude/settings.local.json`, `~/.claude/settings.json` | `env` blocks; `apiKeyHelper` / `awsCredentialExport` commands that print a credential (and run a shell command — see `agent-supply-cha Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reads MCP configurationlowAgent snooping
mcp.json carries server URLs and auth tokens; reading it lets a mod discover and abuse other integrations.
| `.mcp.json`, `~/.claude.json` (user and per-project `mcpServers`) | `env` and `headers` blocks with literal tokens | Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
2. **Verify it's live** — use the provider's verification (`aws sts get-caller-identity`, `stripe balance retrieve`, `curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" ...`) — don't assume; some leaked keys are already revoked or w How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 330 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Secrets Audit — Credential Exposure and Secrets-Management Review
Two halves: (1) find secrets that have already leaked into source, history, or artifacts, and (2) audit the secrets-management posture that determines whether future leaks happen.
Most secret leaks aren't "we forgot to redact" — they're "we never had a system, so every developer made up their own approach." This skill covers both the cleanup and the prevention.
Cross-references: dependency-audit (CI-related secrets risk in build-time exposure), iam-audit (workload identity federation as the alternative to long-lived keys), owasp-audit A02 (in-source secret patterns), agent-supply-chain-audit (the skills, hooks, and MCP servers that sit next to these agent configs and can read them), incident-triage and threat-hunting (the exfiltration-collector domains below as egress indicators), scanner-pipeline (gitleaks / trufflehog across full history and a whole fleet of repos, on a schedule), personal-opsec (the operator's own machine, where agent tokens and pasted secrets actually live).
Authorization
Scan only repositories, CI systems and machines the user owns or is authorized to audit. Never print a full secret: give the type, location, and prefix plus last four. Checking that a key is live ("Verify it's live" below) uses the key, so ask first, use the provider's read-only identity call, and never use a found credential to read data. Rotation and history rewrites are the owner's call and always prompt.
Part 1 — Find leaked secrets
Provider key prefixes (high-confidence patterns)
The most useful first sweep is grep against known provider key prefixes. False positives are low and matches are almost always real.
# Stripe
grep -rE "(sk_live_|sk_test_|rk_live_|whsec_)[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}" . \
--include="*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx,py,rb,go,java,php,sh,env,yml,yaml,json}"
# AWS access keys
grep -rE "(AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}" .
# AWS secret keys (40 chars, base64-y) — high FP rate, use with caution
grep -rE "[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}" . --include="*.env*" --include="*.json"
# GitHub
grep -rE "gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}" .
# Google Cloud API key + service-account JSON
grep -rE "AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{35}" .
grep -rln '"type": "service_account"' . --include="*.json"
# Slack
grep -rE "xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+" .
# OpenAI / Anthropic
grep -rE "sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{32,}" .
grep -rE "sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{90,}" .
# Generic high-entropy strings in env files
grep -rE "^[A-Z_]+=[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{32,}$" . --include="*.env*"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +131 lines · +20 tokens per session scan A → B a40cf2341baf
- 1mo ago First seen · 199 lines · 120 tokens per session scan A 67d335ac6e11
secrets-audit is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository briiirussell/cybersecurity-skills (435 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 140 tokens to every session and 5,960 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (reads agent configuration directories, reads mcp configuration, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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