llm-layer

Project rules for implementing language-model providers in Caliber, including their calls, streaming responses, configuration, model selection, and usage tracking.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use them when adding or changing an LLM provider, configuring provider credentials, supporting streaming, listing models, handling model recovery, or tracking usage.
Why use it?
They define where provider behavior and settings belong and how special cases such as seat-based providers are handled. This keeps new providers consistent with the existing system.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/caliber-ai-org/ai-setup/llm-layer
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/caliber-ai-org/ai-setup

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 195 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.00195
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00097
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00039
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00019

Measured 3d ago against content hash d4ec9a0e8c36, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

llm-layer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/llm-layer.mdc · 13 lines

What it actually says

  • Providers implement LLMProvider from src/llm/types.ts: call(), stream(), optional listModels()
  • Config: env vars → ~/.caliber/config.json via src/llm/config.ts
  • Seat-based: isSeatBased() in src/llm/types.ts (cursor, claude-cli)
  • Cursor: agent --print --trust --workspace /tmp in src/llm/cursor-acp.ts
  • Fast model: getFastModel() in src/llm/config.ts
  • Model recovery: src/llm/model-recovery.ts · Errors: src/llm/seat-based-errors.ts
  • Usage: trackUsage() from src/llm/usage.ts
  • validateModel() skips seat-based providers
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 13 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A d4ec9a0e8c36

Subscribe to this mod's changes

llm-layer is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository caliber-ai-org/ai-setup (1,259 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 195 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.