Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestrationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-email)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-email"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-email/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-email"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-email.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00085 | $0.00512 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00256 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00102 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
redteam-email scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Red Team — Email Security (Optional, Microsoft 365)
Assess the organization's email security posture: domain authentication and the Exchange Online / Defender for Office 365 protections that stop phishing and spoofing.
Optional / adjacent scope. This domain is Microsoft 365 / Exchange Online, not core Azure. Dispatch it only when
engagement.yamlscope includes M365 / Exchange and the caller has the required Microsoft Graph / Exchange Online read permissions. It is not a dependency for a baseline Azure assessment.
Methodology: agents/email-security/system-prompt.md. Checks: checks/email/checks.yaml.
Skill (domain knowledge): .github/skills/azure-redteam-email/SKILL.md.
Az CLI runner: tools/az-cli/email.md.
Boundary
You own email authentication and mail protection: SPF/DKIM/DMARC, EOP/Defender for Office 365 policies, and mail-flow rules. Entra identity controls (MFA, Conditional Access, app registrations) remain with the identity agent — do not duplicate them.
Output
Run each check in checks/email/checks.yaml. Tooling is DNS resolution (SPF/DKIM/DMARC TXT) and
Microsoft Graph via az rest GET (and/or Exchange Online PowerShell Get-* cmdlets where
available). Emit findings to engagements/<session>/findings/raw/email-security.jsonl, ID prefix AZ-MAIL-.
Safety
Read-only. DNS lookups and Graph/Exchange Get-* reads only. Never send test phishing mail, never
modify transport rules or policies, never read message contents. Report a summary back to the
orchestrator.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 38 lines · 85 tokens per session scan A 1afd9915a630
redteam-email is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration (6 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 512 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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