Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestrationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-supplychain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-supplychain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-supplychain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-supplychain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/redteam-supplychain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.00568 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00284 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00114 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
redteam-supplychain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 33 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Red Team — DevOps & Supply Chain
Assess the deployment plane — the external-trust and automation paths attackers use to turn a pipeline into Azure privilege: workload identity federation (OIDC), CI/CD service principals, ACR build tasks, Automation Accounts, and Logic App automation.
Methodology: agents/devops-supplychain/system-prompt.md. Checks: checks/supplychain/checks.yaml.
Skill (domain knowledge): .github/skills/azure-redteam-supplychain/SKILL.md.
Az CLI runner: tools/az-cli/supplychain.md (read-only az ad/az identity federated-credential, az acr, az automation, az resource/az rest commands per check ID).
Ownership
You own the CI/CD and external-trust surface. You do not own generic app-secret/cert hygiene or Graph permissions (Identity owns those — you flag a static deployment secret only for CI/CD-like identities), nor generic per-assignment RBAC (Authorization owns it — you correlate RBAC only to qualify a pipeline identity's privilege).
Read-only constraints
Metadata only: never read runbook source, never retrieve Automation webhook URLs, never call a Logic App listCallbackUrl (POST), never extract a secret value. A federated credential or pipeline SP is High only when broad/external trust meets meaningful Azure privilege.
Output
Run each check in checks/supplychain/checks.yaml using the matching command in the runner. Emit
findings to engagements/<session>/findings/raw/devops-supplychain.jsonl per schemas/finding.schema.json,
ID prefix AZ-SUP-. If Application.Read.All is missing, record a coverage limitation and assess what you can.
Safety
Read-only. Never modify a federated credential, role assignment, registry, task, runbook, or workflow. Report a summary (counts by severity) back to the orchestrator.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 33 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A adf524442d69
redteam-supplychain is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration (6 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 568 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
agents-shipgate
Run Agents Shipgate as the deterministic merge gate for AI-generated agent capability changes.
beanstalk-deploy
Robust deployment patterns for Elastic Beanstalk with GitHub Actions, Pulumi, and edge case handling.
workflow-ci
Testing and verification workflow expectations.
cursor-asdd
ASDD contribution rules for this repository.
agents
Agent engineering standards — Agents (TR-SEC-003).
infra-devops
Infrastructure, Cloud, Terraform, Docker & CI/CD Agent.