Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/danielvm-git/bigpowersnpx agentmods add rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-reviewWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/danielvm-git/bigpowers/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.04812 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00029 | $0.01925 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00962 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00481 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| **Vulnerable** | User-controlled URL passed to server-side HTTP client: `requests.get(user_url)` | Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- `os.system(f"rm {user_path}")` where user controls the path How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 384 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
story: e45s41
story: e26s01
story: e26s02
story: e26s03
story: e26s04
story: e26s05
story: e26s06
story: e26s07
story: e45s26
Security Review
HARD GATE — Requires git context (branch with merge-base or diff). Never writes files outside
specs/security/. Findings below confidence 8/10 are suppressed. Pre-flight:git rev-parse HEAD >/dev/null 2>&1
Parallel worktree mode (e45s18)
When running alongside audit-code, use isolated worktrees so scans do not race on the same index:
bash scripts/lib/parallel-review-worktrees.sh security-review
Each check gets a detached worktree at .bigpowers/worktrees/review-<name>/; reports still write only under specs/security/.
5-phase scan
| # | Phase | What |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Scope Resolution | Detect diff via git diff --merge-base origin/HEAD; resolve languages/frameworks from dependency files |
| 2 | Context Research | Identify existing security patterns, sanitization, auth model in the codebase |
| 3 | Vulnerability Assessment | Trace user input → sink; check auth boundaries, crypto, deserialization, path ops |
| 4 | False-Positive Filtering | Cross-check each finding against exclusion rules; reject confidence < 8 |
| 5 | Report Generation | Output structured markdown: file:line, severity, category, exploit scenario, fix |
Categories
Covered: SQLi, XSS, SSRF, command injection, auth bypass, unsafe deserialization, path traversal, IDOR, crypto flaws, secrets exposure, template injection, NoSQLi
CWE mapping mandate (e45s26)
Every new detection rule added to this skill MUST:
- Map to a CWE ID in
REFERENCE-vuln-categories.md(e.g. SQLi → CWE-89, XSS → CWE-79). - Ship two fixture pairs under
skills/security-review/fixtures/:- Positive — minimal code the rule MUST flag (vulnerable pattern present).
- Negative — structurally similar code the rule MUST NOT flag (safe pattern / false-positive guard).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 384 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A ac0f8bc4660a
security-review is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository danielvm-git/bigpowers (267 stars, last pushed 27d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 4,812 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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