Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/e-gov/cursor-promptsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/e-gov/cursor-prompts/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/e-gov/cursor-prompts/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/e-gov/cursor-prompts/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/e-gov/cursor-prompts/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/e-gov/cursor-prompts/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.02812 | $0.02812 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.01125 | $0.01125 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00562 | $0.00562 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00281 | $0.00281 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 272 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Comprehensive Security Best Practices
Context
- Apply when writing or reviewing any code that handles data, authentication, authorization, or external interactions
- These rules cover both general, language-agnostic principles and specific requirements for web applications/servers
- Based on industry standards including OWASP ASVS and security best practices
Requirements
Input Validation and Output Handling
- Input Validation:
- Sanitize and validate all external input (user input, API requests, file uploads, environment variables) to prevent injection attacks (SQLi, XSS, XXE, command injection)
- Use allow-lists for validation rather than block-lists where possible
- Data selection/database queries must use parameterized queries, ORMs, or equivalent protections
- Protect against OS command injection using parameterized queries or contextual command line output encoding
- All untrusted HTML input from WYSIWYG editors must be sanitized using a secure library
- Avoid eval() or dynamic code execution; if unavoidable, sanitize user input before execution
- Input must be decoded/unescaped into canonical form only once before processing
- Output Encoding:
- Encode output appropriately for its context (HTML, JavaScript, SQL, logs) to prevent XSS and other injection issues
- Use proper
Content-Typeheader field that matches the actual content - Output encoding must be performed as a final step before interpreter use
Authentication and Password Management
- Password Requirements:
- User-set passwords must be at least 8 characters (15+ recommended), up to 64 characters permitted
- Check passwords against known-breached password lists using a k-anonymity API (e.g., HIBP) or equivalent service; do not rely on fixed-size “top-N” lists
- Allow passwords of any composition; no forced complexity requirements
- Password input fields must use type=password; allow paste functionality and password managers
- Verify passwords exactly as received (no truncation or case transformation)
- Authentication Mechanisms:
- Use strong, standard authentication mechanisms with multi-factor authentication
- Implement rate limiting and anti-automation controls against credential stuffing and brute force
- Default accounts (root, admin, sa) must be disabled or removed
- System-generated passwords must be securely random and expire after short use
- No password hints or knowledge-based authentication ("secret questions")
- Users must be able to change passwords with current password verification
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 272 lines · 2,812 tokens per session scan A e4cefbfe6150
security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository e-gov/cursor-prompts (34 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 2,812 tokens to every session, about $0.0112 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
ponytail
Ponytail, lazy senior dev mode. Always pick the simplest solution that works.
angular-20
This rule provides comprehensive best practices and coding standards for Angular development, focusing on modern TypeScript, standalone components, signals, and performance optimizations.
dev-standard
Apache Superset development standards and guidelines for Cursor IDE.
prefer-direct-imports-over-module-mocks
Prefer extracting a testable core over vi.mock / vi.resetModules when unit tests need to reach production logic entangled with config, env, or singletons.
config-validation-and-normalization
Config validation and normalization responsibilities (defineConfig normalizes, the orm section schema validates and resolves paths, the loader reports per-section diagnostics).
control-plane-descriptors
Control plane descriptor and instance implementation patterns.