Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/GoranErhartic/cursor-development-rulesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/goranerhartic/cursor-development-rules/input-sanitization)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/goranerhartic/cursor-development-rules/input-sanitization"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/goranerhartic/cursor-development-rules/input-sanitization/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/goranerhartic/cursor-development-rules/input-sanitization"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/goranerhartic/cursor-development-rules/input-sanitization.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00016 | $0.00661 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00264 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00132 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00066 |
Grade A, and why
input-sanitization scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 104 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Input Sanitization
All external input is untrusted. Sanitize at system boundaries.
Validation vs Sanitization
| Concept | Purpose | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Validation | Reject invalid input | Email must match pattern |
| Sanitization | Transform to safe form | Strip HTML tags, escape chars |
String Inputs
public static class StringSanitizer
{
public static string Sanitize(string? input, int maxLength = 1000)
{
if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(input))
return string.Empty;
return input
.Trim()
.Normalize(NormalizationForm.FormC)
.Truncate(maxLength);
}
}
Rules:
- Trim whitespace
- Normalize Unicode (NFC)
- Enforce maximum length
- Remove control characters
- Use allowlist of permitted characters when possible
SQL Injection Prevention
// CORRECT - Parameterized query
var user = await context.Users
.FirstOrDefaultAsync(u => u.Email == email, ct);
// CORRECT - Raw SQL with parameters
var users = await context.Users
.FromSqlInterpolated($"SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Email = {email}")
.ToListAsync(ct);
// NEVER - String concatenation
var users = await context.Users
.FromSqlRaw($"SELECT * FROM Users WHERE Email = '{email}'") // VULNERABLE!
.ToListAsync(ct);
Path Traversal Prevention
public static string SanitizeFileName(string fileName)
{
var sanitized = Path.GetFileName(fileName); // Strips directory components
var invalid = Path.GetInvalidFileNameChars();
return new string(sanitized.Where(c => !invalid.Contains(c)).ToArray());
}
// Validate path is within allowed directory
public static bool IsPathSafe(string basePath, string requestedPath)
{
var fullPath = Path.GetFullPath(Path.Combine(basePath, requestedPath));
return fullPath.StartsWith(Path.GetFullPath(basePath), StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
}
HTML/XSS Prevention
- Use Razor encoding (automatic in ASP.NET Core views)
- For APIs returning HTML, use
HtmlEncoder.Default.Encode() - NEVER return raw user input in responses
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 104 lines · 16 tokens per session scan A 1038e5339b89
input-sanitization is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository GoranErhartic/cursor-development-rules (19 stars, last pushed 7mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 16 tokens to every session and 661 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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config-validation-and-normalization
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control-plane-descriptors
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