Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/ivangrynenko/cursorrules/drupal-broken-access-controlgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ivangrynenko/cursorrulesWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01342 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00671 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00268 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00134 |
Grade A, and why
drupal-broken-access-control scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Drupal Broken Access Control Security Standards (OWASP A01:2021)
This rule enforces security best practices to prevent broken access control vulnerabilities in Drupal applications, as defined in OWASP Top 10:2021-A01.
Rule Details
-
Name: drupal_broken_access_control
-
Description: Detect and prevent broken access control vulnerabilities in Drupal as defined in OWASP Top 10:2021-A01
Filters
- file extension pattern:
\\.(php|inc|module|install|theme)$ - file path pattern:
(modules|themes|profiles)/custom
Enforcement Checks
- Conditions:
- pattern
\\s*\\$routes\\['[^']*'\\]\\s*=\\s*.*(?!_access|access_callback|requirements)– Route definition is missing access control. Add '_permission', '_role', '_access', or custom access check in requirements.- Pattern 1: Missing access checks in routes
- pattern
user_access\\(– user_access() is deprecated. Use $account->hasPermission() or proper dependency injection with AccessResult methods.- Pattern 2: Using user_access() instead of more secure methods
- pattern
(\\$user->id\\(\\)|\\$user->uid)\\s*===?\\s*1– Avoid hardcoded checks against user ID 1. Use role-based permissions or proper access control services.- Pattern 3: Hard-coded user ID checks
- pattern
\\$entity->(?!access)(save|delete|update)\\(\\)– Entity operation without prior access check. Use $entity->access('operation') before performing operations.- Pattern 4: Missing access check on entity operations
- pattern
\\\\Drupal::currentUser\\(\\)– Avoid using \Drupal::currentUser() directly. Inject the current_user service for better testability and security.- Pattern 5: Using Drupal::currentUser() directly in services
- pattern
class [A-Za-z0-9_]+Controller.+extends ControllerBase[^}]+public function [a-zA-Z0-9_]+\\([^{]*\\)\\s*\\{(?![^}]*access)– Controller method lacks explicit access checking. Add checks via route requirements or within the controller method.- Pattern 6: Missing access checks in controllers
- pattern
\\$entity->set\\([^)]+\\)\\s*;(?![^;]*access)– Direct field value manipulation without access check. Verify entity field access before manipulation.- Pattern 7: Direct field value manipulation without access check
- pattern
@RestResource\\([^)]*\\)(?![^{]*_access|access_callback)– REST resource lacks access controls. Add access checks via annotations or in methods.- Pattern 8: Unprotected REST endpoints
- pattern
\\$_SERVER\\['REMOTE_ADDR'\\]\\s*===?\\s*– IP-based access control is insufficient. Use proper Drupal permission system instead.- Pattern 9: Insecure access check by client IP
- pattern
#cache\\['contexts'\\]\\s*=\\s*\\[[^\\]]*'user'[^\\]]*\\]– Using 'user' cache context without proper access checks may expose content to unauthorized users.- Pattern 10: Allow bypassing cache for authenticated users without proper checks
- pattern
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 91 lines · 1,342 tokens per session scan A ebb4dc03b4cc
drupal-broken-access-control is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository ivangrynenko/cursorrules (88 stars, last pushed 10mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,342 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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