Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/ivangrynenko/cursorrules/drupal-ssrfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ivangrynenko/cursorrulesWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01647 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00823 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00329 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00165 |
Grade A, and why
drupal-ssrf scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 102 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Drupal Server-Side Request Forgery Standards (OWASP A10:2021)
This rule enforces security best practices to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in Drupal applications, as defined in OWASP Top 10:2021-A10.
Rule Details
-
Name: drupal_ssrf
-
Description: Detect and prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in Drupal applications as defined in OWASP Top 10:2021-A10
Filters
- file extension pattern:
\\.(php|inc|module|install|theme)$ - file path pattern:
.*
Enforcement Checks
- Conditions:
- pattern
(file_get_contents|fopen|curl_exec|drupal_http_request|\\$client->request|\\$client->get|Drupal::httpClient\\(\\)->get)\\s*\\([^)]*\\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|SERVER|FILES)[^)]*\\)– Potential SSRF vulnerability: URL constructed with user input. Validate and sanitize user-supplied URL parameters before making requests.- Pattern 1: Unsafe URL construction with user input
- pattern
GuzzleHttp\\\\Client[^;]*;[^;]*->request\\s*\\([^;]*\\$[^;]*– Validate and restrict URLs before making HTTP requests with Guzzle to prevent SSRF attacks.- Pattern 2: Unsafe Guzzle HTTP client usage
- pattern
(Http(Client|Request)|curl_exec|file_get_contents)\\s*\\([^)]*(http|\\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+)[^)]*\\)[^;]*;(?![^;]*(valid|check|sanitize|UrlHelper))– HTTP requests should validate URLs with \Drupal\Component\Utility\UrlHelper::isValid() before execution to prevent SSRF.- Pattern 3: Missing URL validation before making HTTP requests
- pattern
(https?:?//|www\\.)\\s*\\.\\s*\\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+– Potential SSRF vulnerability: URL being constructed with variable concatenation. Use URL validation and allowlisting.- Pattern 4: Unsafe URL construction with variable input
- pattern
file_get_contents\\([\"'](mdc:?:http|https|ftp|php|data|expect|zip|phar)://– Avoid using PHP wrappers with file operations that could lead to SSRF vulnerabilities.- Pattern 5: Using file system wrappers which can lead to SSRF
- pattern
CURLOPT_PROXY[^;]*none|CURLOPT_PROXY[^;]*null– Bypassing proxy settings can lead to SSRF vulnerabilities. Maintain proper proxy configurations.- Pattern 6: Bypassing local proxy settings
- pattern
simplexml_load_|DOMDocument|SimpleXMLElement|xml_parse– XML processing without disabling external entities can lead to XXE and SSRF. Use libxml_disable_entity_loader(true).- Pattern 7: Unsafe processing of XML with external entities
- pattern
(127\\.0\\.0\\.1|10\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}|172\\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}|192\\.168\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}|169\\.254\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}|localhost)– Hardcoded internal IP addresses or localhost may facilitate SSRF attacks if exposed to user manipulation.- Pattern 8: Accessing or using internal network IPs
- pattern
\\\\Drupal::httpClient\\(\\)(?!.*[^;]*UrlHelper::isValid)– Always validate URLs with UrlHelper::isValid() before making HTTP requests with Drupal's HTTP client.- Pattern 9: Custom Drupal HTTP client usage without validation
- pattern
curl_setopt\\([^,]+,\\s*CURLOPT_PORT,\\s*\\$[a-zA-Z0-9_]+– Potential SSRF vulnerability: Restrict allowed ports for outbound HTTP requests to prevent service probing.- Pattern 10: Allowing unrestricted ports in HTTP requests
- pattern
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 102 lines · 1,647 tokens per session scan A 6ce98d61d96c
drupal-ssrf is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository ivangrynenko/cursorrules (87 stars, last pushed 10mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,647 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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