Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/jterratsdev/ableton-live-mcp/infra-data-encryptiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jterratsdev/ableton-live-mcpWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.01373 | $0.01373 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00687 | $0.00687 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00275 | $0.00275 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00137 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
infra-data-encryption scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 82 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Infrastructure, Data & Encryption
When a project involves databases, cloud infrastructure, sensitive data, or multi-environment deployments, these rules apply without exception.
For DevOps tool categories, observability, SLOs, downtime strategy, scalability gates, and infrastructure reporting, see devops-tooling.mdc.
Environment Segregation
- Isolated environments: dev, staging, and production must be fully isolated — separate accounts/subscriptions, separate credentials, separate network boundaries.
- No credential sharing: each environment has its own secrets, service accounts, and IAM roles. Never reuse production credentials in dev/staging.
- Promotion flow: code moves through environments via CI/CD pipelines only. No manual deploys to staging or production.
- Feature flags over environment branches: prefer runtime feature flags to long-lived environment branches.
Infrastructure as Code (IaC)
- All infrastructure must be reproducible: use Terraform, Pulumi, CloudFormation, Bicep, or equivalent. No manual console/portal changes in staging or production.
- State management: IaC state files must be stored remotely (S3 + DynamoDB, Azure Blob, GCS) with locking. Never commit
.tfstateto git. - Modular composition: extract reusable modules for networking, compute, storage. Follow the same SRP principle as application code.
- Drift detection: run plan/preview in CI on every PR that touches infra. Alert on drift between declared and actual state.
- Tagging & cost visibility: every resource must be tagged with
project,environment, andowner. Enable cost alerts per tag.
Database
- Migrations are version-controlled: use a migration framework (Flyway, Liquibase, Alembic, Prisma Migrate, knex). Never run DDL manually in production.
- Migrations must be idempotent and reversible: every
upmust have a correspondingdown. Test rollbacks in staging. - Schema reviews: DDL changes require the same review rigor as application code. Assess impact on indexes, constraints, and existing data.
- Connection pooling: always use connection pools (PgBouncer, HikariCP, etc.). Never open unbounded connections from application code.
- Read replicas & caching: for read-heavy workloads, use replicas. Cache hot data (Redis, Memcached) with explicit TTLs and invalidation strategies.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 82 lines · 1,373 tokens per session scan A b88236453ac3
infra-data-encryption is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository jterratsdev/ableton-live-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 1,373 tokens to every session, about $0.0069 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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