Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jy315189/everything-cursorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/jy315189/everything-cursor/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/jy315189/everything-cursor/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/jy315189/everything-cursor/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/jy315189/everything-cursor/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/jy315189/everything-cursor/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00699 | $0.00699 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00280 | $0.00280 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00140 | $0.00140 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00070 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 116 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Guidelines
Mandatory Security Checks
Before ANY commit:
- No hardcoded secrets (API keys, passwords, tokens)
- All user inputs validated
- SQL injection prevention (parameterized queries)
- XSS prevention (sanitized HTML)
- CSRF protection enabled
- Authentication/authorization verified
- Rate limiting on all endpoints
- Error messages don't leak sensitive data
Secret Management
// NEVER: Hardcoded secrets
const apiKey = "sk-proj-xxxxx"
// ALWAYS: Environment variables
const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY
if (!apiKey) {
throw new Error('OPENAI_API_KEY not configured')
}
Security Checklist by Category
Authentication & Authorization
- Use secure session management
- Implement proper logout functionality
- Use HTTPS everywhere
- Implement account lockout after failed attempts
- Use bcrypt/argon2 for password hashing (not MD5/SHA1)
Data Protection
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest
- Use secure transmission (TLS 1.3)
- Implement proper access controls
- Sanitize all user inputs
API Security
- Use API keys or OAuth 2.0
- Implement rate limiting
- Validate all request parameters
- Use parameterized queries for database access
Input Validation
import { z } from 'zod'
const UserSchema = z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
name: z.string().min(1).max(100),
age: z.number().int().min(0).max(150)
})
// Validate before processing
const validated = UserSchema.parse(req.body)
SQL Injection Prevention
// WRONG: SQL Injection vulnerable
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`
// CORRECT: Parameterized query
const query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1'
await db.query(query, [userId])
// CORRECT: Using ORM
await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: userId } })
XSS Prevention
// WRONG: XSS vulnerable
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userComment }} />
// CORRECT: Use sanitization library if HTML needed
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userComment) }} />
// BEST: Avoid HTML, use plain text
<div>{userComment}</div>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 116 lines · 699 tokens per session scan A 4a2be9d8243e
security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository jy315189/everything-cursor (2 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 699 tokens to every session, about $0.0028 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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angular-20
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dev-standard
Apache Superset development standards and guidelines for Cursor IDE.
prefer-direct-imports-over-module-mocks
Prefer extracting a testable core over vi.mock / vi.resetModules when unit tests need to reach production logic entangled with config, env, or singletons.
config-validation-and-normalization
Config validation and normalization responsibilities (defineConfig normalizes, the orm section schema validates and resolves paths, the loader reports per-section diagnostics).
control-plane-descriptors
Control plane descriptor and instance implementation patterns.