Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin/vspheregit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kubev2v/forklift-console-pluginWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00018 | $0.03145 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00009 | $0.01572 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00629 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00314 |
Grade A, and why
vsphere scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 261 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
vSphere Provider
Analyzed from commit:
412c71822on2026-05-04
Inventory Collection
Connection & Authentication
The collector uses the govmomi library to connect to vCenter or standalone ESXi hosts.
Credentials come from a Kubernetes Secret with these keys:
user— vCenter/ESXi usernamepassword— vCenter/ESXi password
TLS thumbprint comes from provider.Status.Fingerprint. If insecureSkipVerify is not set in the secret, TLS is verified and the thumbprint is computed from the server certificate.
SDK endpoint validation: The provider's spec.settings["sdkEndpoint"] value (vCenter or ESXI) is checked against the actual server type. Mismatches fail the connection.
Collection Mechanism
The collector uses vSphere's PropertyCollector with WaitForUpdatesEx — a long-polling mechanism that blocks until the server reports changes.
Connect → Create PropertyCollector → Create Filter → WaitForUpdatesEx loop
Key constants:
RetryDelay: 5 seconds between reconnection attemptsMaxObjectUpdates: 10,000 objects per update batchConnectionTimeout: 30 seconds
Tracked vSphere object types:
| vSphere Type | Model Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
Folder |
Folder |
Hierarchy container |
Datacenter |
Datacenter |
Top-level organizational unit |
ClusterComputeResource |
Cluster |
Also handles standalone ComputeResource (variant) |
HostSystem |
Host |
ESXi host |
Network |
Network |
Standard network (variant=Standard) |
OpaqueNetwork |
Network |
NSX-T network (variant=OpaqueNetwork) |
DistributedVirtualPortgroup |
Network |
DVS port group (variant=DvPortGroup) |
VmwareDistributedVirtualSwitch |
Network |
DVS switch (variant=DvSwitch) |
Datastore |
Datastore |
Storage |
VirtualMachine |
VM |
VMs — templates are excluded from API responses |
Parity: After the first complete WaitForUpdatesEx response (not truncated), parity=true is set and model watches begin.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 261 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A 60ae5d4cdd5c
vsphere is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository kubev2v/forklift-console-plugin (11 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 3,145 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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