log-sanitization

A set of rules for keeping passwords, tokens, API keys, and other credentials out of server logs. It requires explicit redaction at log call sites and a global filter as a backup.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when logging parameters, URLs, access tokens, or other request details in a server application.
Why use it?
It reduces the risk that secrets are exposed through logs, which are often stored, copied, or accessed by more people than the application itself.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/microsoft/data-formulator/log-sanitization
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/microsoft/data-formulator

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 1,027 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.01027
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00513
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00205
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00103

Measured yesterday against content hash 22aa7feb8a62, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

log-sanitization scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/log-sanitization.mdc · 108 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 108 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Log Sanitization

Server-side logs must never contain passwords, tokens, API keys, or other credentials in plain text. This rule complements error-response-safety.mdc (which covers client responses) by addressing the logging side.

Architecture: Defense in Depth

Two layers protect against sensitive data in logs:

  1. Layer 1 — Explicit utilities (call-site): developers use sanitize_url(), sanitize_params(), redact_token() from security/log_sanitizer.py.
  2. Layer 2 — SensitiveDataFilter (global): a logging.Filter registered on all handlers in configure_logging() auto-redacts patterns that slip through.

Layer 1 is the primary defense; Layer 2 is a safety net. Both are required.

When to Use Each Utility

Data Type Utility Example
dict with password/secret/token keys sanitize_params(params) log.info("Init: %s", sanitize_params(params))
URL (may have user:pass@host or sensitive query params) sanitize_url(url) logger.info("Connecting to %s", sanitize_url(url))
Bearer / access token redact_token(token) logger.debug("Token: %s", redact_token(token))
Normal string (no secrets) Nothing needed logger.info("Processing table %s", name)

Rules

  1. Never log raw params / config dicts that may contain password, secret, api_key, token, or connection_string keys. Always use sanitize_params().

  2. Never log full tokens or API keys. Use redact_token() if you need to identify a token in logs.

  3. Prefer type(exc).__name__ over str(exc) in warning/info logs when the exception may contain connection strings or upstream response bodies. Use exc_info=True for full tracebacks at ERROR level (the filter sanitizes exc_text).

  4. URL logging — use sanitize_url() for any URL from configuration or environment variables (issuer URLs, JWKS URLs, database URLs, API base URLs). It masks embedded credentials and sensitive query parameters such as password, client_secret, token, and api_key.

Read the full file on GitHub · 108 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 108 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 22aa7feb8a62

Subscribe to this mod's changes

log-sanitization is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository microsoft/data-formulator (17,048 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,027 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.