Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mission69b/t2000Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/mission69b/t2000/machine-front-door)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/mission69b/t2000/machine-front-door"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/mission69b/t2000/machine-front-door/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/mission69b/t2000/machine-front-door"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/mission69b/t2000/machine-front-door.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.00333 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.00133 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00067 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00033 |
Grade A, and why
machine-front-door scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Machine Front Door → .claude/skills/t2000-machine-front-door/SKILL.md
The invariant: t2000.ai/llms.txt (served from
audric/apps/console/app/llms.txt/route.ts) is the single machine playbook —
never create a second SSOT. Update it only when a machine contract changes
(public api.t2000.ai/v1/* shapes, CLI marketplace/wallet verbs, Connect auth
model or connector URL, discovery URLs, who can sign, earn-first/fee/open-reject
locks) — never for UI polish. Connect always signs as Passport, never a local
key. The skills manifest enumerates from t2000-skills/feed.json, gated by
validate.ts in CI.
Read the full rule before editing llms.txt, well-known routes, or
agent-discovery copy: .claude/skills/t2000-machine-front-door/SKILL.md —
gate list, facts that must stay true, verify curls.
(Pointer only — do not re-inline the content here; same pattern as env-validation-gate.mdc so Cursor and Claude Code cannot drift.)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 23 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 6ae74d296e53
machine-front-door is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository mission69b/t2000 (23 stars, last pushed 26d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 333 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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