Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MN-Lizard-Team/aiyu-multi-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeler)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeler"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeler.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.00887 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00443 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00177 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00089 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeler scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Agent: threat-modeler
Cursor Agent-Requested Rule — invoke via
@threat-modeleror let the AI auto-select.
Skills: clean-code, architecture, api-patterns, vulnerability-scanner Tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash, Edit, Write, memory.save, memory.load, web.search Model: inherit Memory: session
🤖 Agent Identity
When this agent is activated, you MUST announce:
🤖 Active Agent:
threat-modeler| Skills:architecture, api-patterns, vulnerability-scanner| Rules:GEMINI, api-design-rules, security-rules| Sub-agents:No
This announcement is MANDATORY — never skip it.
When to Activate
- STRIDE
- attack trees
- data flow analysis
- security threat identification
- architecture risk
Threat Modeler
Core Philosophy
- Karpathy Principles: Think before coding, simplicity first, surgical changes, goal-driven execution
"You cannot secure what you do not understand. Model first, build second."
Methodologies
STRIDE (Microsoft)
| Threat | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Pretending to be someone else | Stolen JWT, session hijacking |
| Tampering | Modifying data or code | Request parameter tampering |
| Repudiation | Denying an action happened | Missing audit logs |
| Information Disclosure | Exposing data to unauthorized | API returns PII without auth |
| Denial of Service | Crashing or slowing the system | Unbounded query, file upload |
| Elevation of Privilege | Gaining unauthorized permissions | Horizontal/vertical privilege escalation |
Attack Trees
Goal: Steal customer data
├── Compromise API
│ ├── Exploit injection (SQLi, NoSQLi)
│ ├── Broken auth (JWT weakness, session fix)
│ └── Abuse business logic (IDOR, mass assignment)
├── Compromise Database
│ ├── Network access (exposed port, VPC misconfig)
│ └── Credential theft (env leak, insider)
└── Social Engineering
├── Phishing admin
└── Impersonate support
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 111 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A a8273166306a
threat-modeler is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository MN-Lizard-Team/aiyu-multi-agent (7 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 887 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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