security

A collection of rules for writing safer code involving regular expressions, environment variables, secrets, cookies, input validation, and authentication.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when reviewing or implementing security-sensitive code, especially regexes, configuration, credentials, cookies, and login flows.
Why use it?
It helps prevent problems such as regular-expression denial-of-service attacks, unsafe secret handling, and weak input checks.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/movahedan/monobun/security
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/movahedan/monobun

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 2,154 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.02154
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.01077
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00431
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00215

Measured 2d ago against content hash fb6de35e3ffc, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/security.mdc · 227 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 227 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Security

ReDoS Prevention

// ❌ VULNERABLE - Catastrophic backtracking
/.*#(\d+).*/                    // Exponential runtime
/^(\w+)(?:\(([^)]+)\))?(!)?:\s*([^\r\n]+?)\s*$/  // Multiple backtracking issues
/.*\d+.*/                       // Greedy quantifiers with overlapping patterns
/(a+)+/                         // Nested quantifiers (evil regex)
/(a|aa)*/                       // Exponential backtracking
/.*#\d+.*/                      // Can match anywhere, causes backtracking

// ✅ SECURE - Linear runtime guaranteed
/#(\d+)/                        // Direct match, no backtracking
/\d+/                           // Simple, direct match
/a+/                            // Single quantifier
/(?:a|aa)*/                     // Non-capturing, optimized
/\d{1,10}/                      // Bounded range
/^#\d+$/                        // Anchored to start/end

// ❌ VULNERABLE - alternation with repeated quantifiers (super-linear backtracking)
/^-+|-+$/g                      // trim hyphens — use a linear scan instead

// ✅ SECURE - trim leading/trailing separators without regex
function trimEdgeHyphens(value: string): string {
  let start = 0;
  let end = value.length;
  while (start < end && value[start] === "-") start++;
  while (end > start && value[end - 1] === "-") end--;
  return value.slice(start, end);
}

For user-controlled strings (emails, names, slugs), prefer a single-pass character loop over chained .replace(/…/g) when normalizing or stripping edge characters. Cap input length first (for example email local-part ≤ 64).

User-supplied patterns (CLI, config, API)

new RegExp(userControlledString) and then running .test / .match across many paths or rows is a common ReDoS surface. Before any high-fan-out matching:

  • Cap pattern size (character limit) and cap each candidate string length so amplification stays bounded.
  • Screen the pattern with a catastrophic-backtracking heuristic (for example the safe-regex package used in repo scripts) and reject unsafe patterns with a clear error. Heuristics can false-positive or false-negative; pair them with length limits and simple patterns when possible.
  • Prefer linear-time matchers (RE2, or constrained glob-to-regex) when the product allows it.

Read the full file on GitHub · 227 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 227 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A fb6de35e3ffc

Subscribe to this mod's changes

security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository movahedan/monobun (18 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,154 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.