Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/movahedan/monobunWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/movahedan/monobun/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/movahedan/monobun/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/movahedan/monobun/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/movahedan/monobun/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/movahedan/monobun/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.02154 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00862 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00431 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00215 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 227 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security
ReDoS Prevention
// ❌ VULNERABLE - Catastrophic backtracking
/.*#(\d+).*/ // Exponential runtime
/^(\w+)(?:\(([^)]+)\))?(!)?:\s*([^\r\n]+?)\s*$/ // Multiple backtracking issues
/.*\d+.*/ // Greedy quantifiers with overlapping patterns
/(a+)+/ // Nested quantifiers (evil regex)
/(a|aa)*/ // Exponential backtracking
/.*#\d+.*/ // Can match anywhere, causes backtracking
// ✅ SECURE - Linear runtime guaranteed
/#(\d+)/ // Direct match, no backtracking
/\d+/ // Simple, direct match
/a+/ // Single quantifier
/(?:a|aa)*/ // Non-capturing, optimized
/\d{1,10}/ // Bounded range
/^#\d+$/ // Anchored to start/end
// ❌ VULNERABLE - alternation with repeated quantifiers (super-linear backtracking)
/^-+|-+$/g // trim hyphens — use a linear scan instead
// ✅ SECURE - trim leading/trailing separators without regex
function trimEdgeHyphens(value: string): string {
let start = 0;
let end = value.length;
while (start < end && value[start] === "-") start++;
while (end > start && value[end - 1] === "-") end--;
return value.slice(start, end);
}
For user-controlled strings (emails, names, slugs), prefer a single-pass character loop over chained .replace(/…/g) when normalizing or stripping edge characters. Cap input length first (for example email local-part ≤ 64).
User-supplied patterns (CLI, config, API)
new RegExp(userControlledString) and then running .test / .match across many paths or rows is a common ReDoS surface. Before any high-fan-out matching:
- Cap pattern size (character limit) and cap each candidate string length so amplification stays bounded.
- Screen the pattern with a catastrophic-backtracking heuristic (for example the
safe-regexpackage used in repo scripts) and reject unsafe patterns with a clear error. Heuristics can false-positive or false-negative; pair them with length limits and simple patterns when possible. - Prefer linear-time matchers (RE2, or constrained glob-to-regex) when the product allows it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 227 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A fb6de35e3ffc
security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository movahedan/monobun (18 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,154 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
ponytail
Ponytail, lazy senior dev mode. Always pick the simplest solution that works.
angular-20
This rule provides comprehensive best practices and coding standards for Angular development, focusing on modern TypeScript, standalone components, signals, and performance optimizations.
dev-standard
Apache Superset development standards and guidelines for Cursor IDE.
prefer-assertions-over-defensive-checks
Prefer assertions over defensive checks when data is guaranteed to be valid.
prefer-direct-imports-over-module-mocks
Prefer extracting a testable core over vi.mock / vi.resetModules when unit tests need to reach production logic entangled with config, env, or singletons.
config-validation-and-normalization
Config validation and normalization responsibilities (defineConfig normalizes, the orm section schema validates and resolves paths, the loader reports per-section diagnostics).