Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standards/ci-cd-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standardsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00182 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00091 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00036 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00018 |
Grade A, and why
ci-cd-supply-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
CI/CD Supply Chain
TR-SEC-009 — CI pipelines run least-privilege and fully pinned
Every CI workflow declares an explicit least-privilege permissions block (default contents: read; broader scopes granted per-job with a comment stating why). Third-party CI actions are pinned to a full commit SHA, not a mutable tag, with the human-readable version in a trailing comment. Runtime dependencies past POC tier are pinned to exact versions so the audited dependency set is the set that runs. Counters MITRE ATT&CK T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise) and limits the blast radius of a compromised workflow token.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 13 lines · 15 tokens per session scan A f549a2f2e65e
ci-cd-supply-chain is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standards (3 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 15 tokens to every session and 182 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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