Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standards/secrets-managementgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standardsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00207 | $0.00207 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00103 | $0.00103 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00041 | $0.00041 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00021 |
Grade A, and why
secrets-management scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Secrets Management
TR-SEC-001 — No hardcoded secrets
All secrets must be stored in a vault. Never hardcoded in configuration files, source code, comments, or test fixtures.
TR-SEC-008 — Local credential files are permission-restricted and secret-scanned
Files holding secrets on a development or production host (.env files, key files, token caches) must be readable by the owning user only (mode 600). While secrets live in local files rather than a vault (TR-SEC-001's target state), a secret-scanning check must run before commit, not only at public-release time. Counters MITRE ATT&CK T1552.001 (Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 17 lines · 207 tokens per session scan A e90d7d33f3bf
secrets-management is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository onesimplecode/agent-engineering-standards (3 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 207 tokens to every session, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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