Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00013 | $0.00505 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00253 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00101 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 54 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: threat-modeling
Threat Modeling
Purpose
Reason systematically about how a change could be abused, so security findings are concrete and prioritized rather than generic.
When to use it
- For changes touching untrusted input, auth, secrets, filesystem/command execution, dependencies, generated-file ownership, or untrusted instructions.
- During the
/councilsecurity review.
Instructions
- List the assets worth protecting (data, credentials, integrity of generated files, execution surface).
- List the actors (users, other services, malicious input, compromised deps) and the entry points they reach.
- Draw the trust boundaries the change crosses; note where untrusted data becomes trusted.
- Enumerate misuse cases: injection, traversal/symlink escape, privilege misuse, secret exposure, supply-chain tampering, prompt injection.
- For each realistic threat, give the exploit path, severity, and a concrete mitigation. Separate vulnerabilities (exploitable now) from optional hardening.
- Decide whether a fuller, standalone threat model is warranted.
Output format
A threat model: assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, ranked threats (each with exploit path, severity, mitigation), vulnerabilities vs. hardening, and residual risk.
Anti-patterns
- Generic checklists with no exploit path or repository evidence.
- Labelling optional hardening as a live vulnerability (or vice versa).
- Naming secret values instead of the configuration key or source.
- Stopping at "validate input" without identifying the specific sink.
Verification checklist
- Trust boundaries and entry points are explicit.
- Each threat has an exploit path, severity, and concrete mitigation.
- Vulnerabilities and hardening are clearly separated.
- The need for a formal threat model is decided, with reasons.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 54 lines · 13 tokens per session scan A 28d5ca374369
threat-modeling is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 13 tokens to every session and 505 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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