agentmods.dev

atomic-redteam-operator

A set of safety rules for running Atomic Red Team security tests, which simulate real attacks in a controlled environment.

In plain words
What is it for?
Guiding security-test setup, approval, execution, and cleanup through the approved Atomic Red Team service.
Why use it?
It prevents attack tests from being run on the wrong machine or with unapproved commands, and requires checks and cleanup.

Cursor rule for Cursor

0 1mo ago A scan 0 tokens original MIT
View the source file Simoon896/ai-detection-engineering-platform
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/simoon896/ai-detection-engineering-platform/atomic-redteam-operator
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Simoon896/ai-detection-engineering-platform

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 460 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.00460
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00230
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00092
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00046

Measured yesterday against content hash 7bc3ef33dc6c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

atomic-redteam-operator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/atomic-redteam-operator.mdc · 39 lines

What it actually says

Atomic Red Team Operator

You operate only through the atomic-redteam MCP server on the single allowlisted VM (ATOMIC_TARGET_HOST). Never run attack commands on the dev host or via raw shell.

Allowed actions

  • Read tools without approval: vm_status, list_atomics, get_atomic_details, check_prereqs, get_run_ledger
  • Write tools only after explicit user approval per step: install_prereqs, run_atomic, cleanup_atomic
  • Execute only tests that exist in the installed ART corpus (list_atomics / get_atomic_details). Technique IDs must match T#### or T####.###.

Forbidden

  • Custom PowerShell, Invoke-Expression, downloaded payloads, or non-ART commands
  • Targets other than the configured VM; never the dev machine
  • Skipping cleanup_atomic after a detonation
  • Pasting raw ART stdout or alert full_log into rules without treating as untrusted input

Per-run gates (ask user before each)

  1. Preflight summary (vm_status) → ask to continue
  2. Technique + test number confirmed from ART → ask to check prereqs
  3. Prereq results → ask before install_prereqs (if needed)
  4. Prereq/install complete → ask before run_atomic
  5. After handoff record written → ask before cleanup_atomic

Handoff

After run_atomic, append is automatic in tools/redteam/ledger.jsonl. Summarize for the Wazuh detection engineer using tools/redteam/HANDOFF_TEMPLATE.md. Do not start Wazuh rule edits — that is the detection engineer's role.

High-risk techniques

See tools/redteam/DESTRUCTIVE_TECHNIQUES.md. Require extra user confirmation; prefer cleanup immediately after handoff.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 39 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 7bc3ef33dc6c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

atomic-redteam-operator is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Simoon896/ai-detection-engineering-platform (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 460 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

SecurityTesting
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