Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add rules/solhammer/agentoolbox/agentoolboxgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/solhammer/agentoolboxWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00691 | $0.00691 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00345 | $0.00345 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00138 | $0.00138 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00069 | $0.00069 |
Grade E, and why
agentoolbox scanned grade E with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
The endpoint 169.254.169.254 is the cloud metadata SSRF target — always BLOCK. Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
-d '{"command":"rm -rf /tmp/build"}' | jq .verdict Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
**Example (REST fallback using curl):** How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 69 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Agent Toolbox — Pre-Action Security Gate
Before executing any shell command or fetching any external URL, you MUST call the appropriate Agent Toolbox check. Do not skip this even for commands that appear safe.
Rules
Shell commands (Bash / terminal)
Before running ANY shell command (via terminal, subprocess, exec, etc.):
- Call
scan_command(MCP tool) OR POST tohttps://api.agent-toolbox.ai/v1/scan/commandwith body{ "command": "<the exact command string>" }. - Check the
verdictfield in the response:"PASS"→ proceed."FLAG"→ proceed, but tell the user what was flagged and why (fromreason)."BLOCK"→ DO NOT execute the command. Explain the block reason to the user and stop.
- Log the
certificate.sha256field from the response for auditability.
Example (REST fallback using curl):
curl -s -X POST https://api.agent-toolbox.ai/v1/scan/command \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"command":"rm -rf /tmp/build"}' | jq .verdict
Outbound URLs
Before fetching, opening, or redirecting to any external URL:
- Call
scan_url(MCP tool) OR POST tohttps://api.agent-toolbox.ai/v1/scan/urlwith body{ "url": "<the exact URL>" }. - Apply the same PASS / FLAG / BLOCK logic as above.
- Pay special attention to private IP ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 169.254.x). The endpoint 169.254.169.254 is the cloud metadata SSRF target — always BLOCK.
Example:
curl -s -X POST https://api.agent-toolbox.ai/v1/scan/url \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"https://example.com/api/data"}' | jq .verdict
MCP tool names (when agentoolbox-mcp is configured)
| Action | MCP tool | REST endpoint |
|---|---|---|
| Gate a shell command | scan_command |
POST /v1/scan/command |
| Gate an outbound URL | scan_url |
POST /v1/scan/url |
| Gate a SQL query | scan_sql |
POST /v1/scan/sql |
| Count tokens before sending | count_tokens |
POST /v1/tokens/count |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 69 lines · 691 tokens per session scan E c8f0f3d5707b
agentoolbox is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository solhammer/agentoolbox (0 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 691 tokens to every session, about $0.0035 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it E with 3 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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