Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vibestackdev/vibe-stackWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00789 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00316 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00158 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00079 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 95 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security & OWASP Top 10
CRITICAL: AI models will generate insecure code by default. These rules are non-negotiable.
1. Injection Prevention (A03:2021)
NEVER use string interpolation in database queries.
// ❌ SQL INJECTION VULNERABILITY
const { data } = await supabase.rpc('search', { query: `%${userInput}%` })
// ✅ SAFE: Use parameterized queries
const { data } = await supabase
.from('items')
.select()
.ilike('name', `%${userInput}%`) // Supabase auto-escapes
2. XSS Prevention (A07:2021)
// ❌ XSS VULNERABILITY — NEVER do this
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userContent }} />
// ✅ If you MUST render HTML, sanitize first
import DOMPurify from 'isomorphic-dompurify'
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userContent) }} />
3. Authentication Boundary (A01:2021 - Broken Access Control)
EVERY Server Action and Route Handler MUST verify auth before ANY data operation:
export async function deleteItem(id: string) {
const supabase = await createClient()
const { data: { user } } = await supabase.auth.getUser()
if (!user) return { error: 'Unauthorized' }
// ALSO verify ownership — don't just check auth
const { data: item } = await supabase
.from('items')
.select('user_id')
.eq('id', id)
.single()
if (item?.user_id !== user.id) return { error: 'Forbidden' }
await supabase.from('items').delete().eq('id', id)
}
4. Rate Limiting (A04:2021 - Insecure Design)
Sensitive endpoints MUST be rate limited:
import { Ratelimit } from '@upstash/ratelimit'
import { Redis } from '@upstash/redis'
const ratelimit = new Ratelimit({
redis: Redis.fromEnv(),
limiter: Ratelimit.slidingWindow(5, '60 s'), // 5 requests per minute
})
export async function POST(request: Request) {
const ip = request.headers.get('x-forwarded-for') ?? '127.0.0.1'
const { success } = await ratelimit.limit(ip)
if (!success) {
return Response.json({ error: 'Rate limited' }, { status: 429 })
}
// ... handle request
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 95 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 3de32f62d6a9
security is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository vibestackdev/vibe-stack (8 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 789 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other cursor rules, from other repositories
components
React component, styling, theme, accessibility, and RTL instructions.
vibe-tools
Global Rule. This rule should ALWAYS be loaded.
multi-zone-architecture
Multi-zone architecture allows Shipkit applications to be split into multiple Next.js applications while appearing as a single domain to users. This pattern is ideal for.
database-patterns
Use the createTable function with consistent naming.
documentation-system
The Shipkit documentation system uses dynamic file-based loading from the /docs directory at the project root. It supports both .mdx and .md files with full production-ready security features.
local-storage-patterns
Shipkit uses browser local storage as a fallback when no database is configured. This provides a zero-config development experience while maintaining feature parity with database mode.