stripe-webhooks

A set of rules for securely handling Stripe webhooks, which are requests Stripe sends to your application about payment events.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when writing webhook endpoints that receive Stripe events and need to verify the request before processing payments or subscriptions.
Why use it?
It prevents untrusted requests from triggering subscription changes, refunds, or account updates without proving they came from Stripe.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/vibestackdev/vibe-stack/stripe-webhooks
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vibestackdev/vibe-stack

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 0 Nothing until a file matches its globs; then the whole rule loads.
When invoked 528 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.00528
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00264
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00106
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00053

Measured 2d ago against content hash 1b7e7b9f4bf2, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

stripe-webhooks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursor/rules/stripe-webhooks.mdc · 79 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Stripe Webhook Security

RULE 1: ALWAYS Verify Webhook Signatures First

The AI will generate webhook handlers that process the payload directly. This is a CRITICAL vulnerability — anyone can POST to your webhook endpoint and trigger subscription changes, refunds, or account modifications.

import Stripe from 'stripe'

const stripe = new Stripe(process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY!)

export async function POST(request: Request) {
  const body = await request.text() // Must be raw text, NOT .json()
  const signature = request.headers.get('stripe-signature')

  if (!signature) {
    return Response.json({ error: 'Missing signature' }, { status: 400 })
  }

  let event: Stripe.Event

  try {
    event = stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(
      body,
      signature,
      process.env.STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET!
    )
  } catch (err) {
    console.error('[STRIPE_WEBHOOK_VERIFICATION_FAILED]', err)
    return Response.json({ error: 'Invalid signature' }, { status: 400 })
  }

  // NOW it's safe to process the event
  switch (event.type) {
    case 'checkout.session.completed':
      await handleCheckoutCompleted(event.data.object)
      break
    case 'customer.subscription.updated':
      await handleSubscriptionUpdated(event.data.object)
      break
    case 'customer.subscription.deleted':
      await handleSubscriptionDeleted(event.data.object)
      break
  }

  return Response.json({ received: true })
}

RULE 2: NEVER Use request.json() for Webhooks

Stripe signature verification requires the RAW request body as a string. If you parse it with request.json() first, the verification will ALWAYS fail because JSON.stringify produces different whitespace than the original payload.

// ❌ WRONG — signature verification will always fail
const body = await request.json()
stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(JSON.stringify(body), sig, secret)

// ✅ CORRECT — use raw text
const body = await request.text()
stripe.webhooks.constructEvent(body, sig, secret)

Read the full file on GitHub · 79 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 79 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 1b7e7b9f4bf2

Subscribe to this mod's changes

stripe-webhooks is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository vibestackdev/vibe-stack (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 528 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.