Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/victusfate/scaffoldWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/victusfate/scaffold/jev-typesafe)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/victusfate/scaffold/jev-typesafe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/victusfate/scaffold/jev-typesafe/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/victusfate/scaffold/jev-typesafe"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/victusfate/scaffold/jev-typesafe.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.00062 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00025 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00012 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00006 |
Grade A, and why
jev-typesafe scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
@../../skills/jev-typesafe.md
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago Changed · -14 tokens per session 4278a67a113d
- 21d ago First seen · 6 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A 909b3b6a8f2f
jev-typesafe is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository victusfate/scaffold (6 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 62 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-26.
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