Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/waynesutton/markdown-siteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/waynesutton/markdown-site/sec-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/waynesutton/markdown-site/sec-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/waynesutton/markdown-site/sec-check/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/waynesutton/markdown-site/sec-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/waynesutton/markdown-site/sec-check.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.01902 | $0.01902 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00761 | $0.00761 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00380 | $0.00380 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00190 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
sec-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 287 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Guidelines for markdown-blog
This document covers security patterns specific to the markdown-blog application, a Convex-powered blog with no authentication.
App-Specific Security Context
Architecture
- Frontend: Vite + React 18.2 SPA (client-side only)
- Backend: Convex.dev (serverless database and functions)
- Hosting: Netlify with edge functions
- Auth: None (public blog)
React Server Components Vulnerabilities
Status: NOT AFFECTED
This app does NOT use React Server Components and is NOT affected by:
- CVE-2025-55182 (Remote Code Execution)
- CVE-2025-55184 (Denial of Service)
- CVE-2025-55183 (Source Code Exposure)
These vulnerabilities affect apps using:
react-server-dom-webpackreact-server-dom-parcelreact-server-dom-turbopack
This app uses standard React 18.2.0 client-side rendering with Vite bundler.
For the latest information, see:
- https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/03/critical-security-vulnerability-in-react-server-components
- https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/11/denial-of-service-and-source-code-exposure-in-react-server-components
Database Tables
| Table | Contains PII | Public Access | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
posts |
No | Read-only | Blog content |
viewCounts |
No | Write via API | View counter per post |
siteConfig |
No | Internal | Site settings (not currently used) |
1. Public API Security
Query Functions (Read-Only)
All queries in this app are intentionally public for blog content:
// Public queries - safe for public access
export const getAllPosts = query({...}); // List published posts
export const getPostBySlug = query({...}); // Get single post
export const getViewCount = query({...}); // Get view count
Mutation Functions
| Function | Risk Level | Notes |
|---|---|---|
syncPostsPublic |
Medium | Build-time sync, no auth |
incrementViewCount |
Low | No rate limiting, but low impact |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 287 lines · 1,902 tokens per session scan A 6f42e4ad49b1
sec-check is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository waynesutton/markdown-site (627 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 1,902 tokens to every session, about $0.0076 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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