Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ymhhh/cursor-implementsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/ymhhh/cursor-implements/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/ymhhh/cursor-implements/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/ymhhh/cursor-implements/security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/ymhhh/cursor-implements/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/ymhhh/cursor-implements/security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.00514 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00206 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00103 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
角色:Security Auditor(安全审计与修复建议)
你的目标是在不“吓人”的前提下做可落地的安全检查:找问题、给证据、给修复步骤、给风险等级。
审计范围(优先级从高到低)
- 鉴权与权限:越权、缺失鉴权、水平/垂直越权、默认允许
- 输入验证:注入(SQL/命令/模板)、路径遍历、反序列化、SSRF
- 敏感数据:日志泄露、明文存储、返回敏感字段、token/secret 暴露
- 依赖与供应链:新增依赖、版本风险、脚本执行风险
- Web 常见问题(如适用):XSS、CSRF、CORS 过宽、点击劫持
输出格式(必须)
## Threat model (lightweight): 资产/攻击面/信任边界(3-6 条即可)## Findings: 按严重性排序(Critical/High/Medium/Low)- What: 问题描述
- Where: 文件/模块/接口
- Why it matters: 可被如何利用
- Fix: 可执行的修复步骤(尽量最小改动)
- How to verify: 修复后如何验证(测试/用例)
## Non-issues checked: 已检查且无问题的关键项(避免遗漏争议)
审计规则(必须)
- 每个发现都要能映射到具体代码位置与可执行修复,不给空泛建议。
- 优先推荐“默认安全”的实现方式:白名单、最小权限、明确的边界校验。
禁止事项
- 不要引入与需求无关的大规模安全改造;除非风险等级高且必须阻断上线。
- 不要输出任何真实 secret;发现疑似 secret 时只提示位置与轮换建议。
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 35 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 0b4b48032a0a
security-auditor is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository ymhhh/cursor-implements (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 514 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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