cursorrules

A set of coding and security rules for a project that produces proof-of-concept Python scripts and vulnerability reports. It also requires keeping summary and metadata files synchronized.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when writing security proof-of-concept scripts, organizing vulnerability findings, or updating the project’s summary and metadata files.
Why use it?
It gives security testing work consistent file names, safe testing boundaries, error handling, and report locations. This reduces accidental destructive actions and documentation drift.

Cursor rule for Cursor

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/Cybermes

Made for: Cursor.

Per session 472 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 472 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00472 $0.00472
Opus 5 $0.00236 $0.00236
Sonnet 5 $0.00094 $0.00094
Haiku 4.5 $0.00047 $0.00047

Measured yesterday against content hash a6f3f8bf2604, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

cursorrules scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.cursorrules · 29 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 29 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

=============================================================================

Cybermes Coding Standards & Operational Rules (.cursorrules)

=============================================================================

1. PYTHON POC SCRIPTING CONVENTIONS

  • Always write clean, self-contained Python 3 scripts for Proof-of-Concept verification.
  • Use requests or httpx with explicit timeout=10 on all network requests.
  • Set a realistic User-Agent header (e.g., User-Agent: Cybermes-Security-Auditor/1.0).
  • Ensure all scripts accept a target URL as a CLI argument (sys.argv[1]) with fallback to the tested default.
  • Include proper error handling (try/except requests.exceptions.RequestException) and colorized status prints.
  • PoC scripts MUST demonstrate minimal-impact reproduction (e.g. read non-sensitive test fields or trigger benign diffs). NEVER script destructive actions.

2. FILE & PATH NAMING STANDARDS

  • Vulnerability reports MUST be placed in reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/findings/<severity>_<vuln_name>.md.
  • Use lowercase snake_case for all filenames (e.g., high_idor_documents.md, poc_login_bypass.py).
  • NEVER use square brackets [...] or special shell characters in file names.
  • Informational observations, missing security headers, and negative test tables MUST go to reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/evidence/recon_notes.md, NEVER scattered as individual files in findings/.
  • Maintain open permissions: all newly created files should have permissions readable by the host user (umask 0002 / 0666).

3. SECRET HYGIENE & CREDENTIAL PROTECTION

  • NEVER commit real API keys, bearer tokens, or sensitive client passwords to Git repositories.
  • When saving evidence or writing markdown reports, always redact sensitive tokens (e.g., Bearer [REDACTED_TEST_TOKEN], password: [REDACTED]).
  • All environment configurations must read from .env or system environment variables.

4. REPORT AGGREGATION

  • After writing or modifying finding files in reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/findings/, always execute: aggregate_reports <TARGET_SLUG> to keep SUMMARY.md and metadata.json synchronized.

Read the full file on GitHub · 29 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 29 lines · 472 tokens per session scan A a6f3f8bf2604

Subscribe to this mod's changes

cursorrules is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 472 tokens to every session, about $0.0024 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.