Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Zyrexnn/Cybermes. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Zyrexnn/Cybermes/main/.cursorrulesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/CybermesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/rules/zyrexnn/cybermes/cursorrules.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00472 | $0.00472 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00189 | $0.00189 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00094 | $0.00094 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00047 | $0.00047 |
Grade A, and why
cursorrules scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 29 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
=============================================================================
Cybermes Coding Standards & Operational Rules (.cursorrules)
=============================================================================
1. PYTHON POC SCRIPTING CONVENTIONS
- Always write clean, self-contained Python 3 scripts for Proof-of-Concept verification.
- Use
requestsorhttpxwith explicittimeout=10on all network requests. - Set a realistic User-Agent header (e.g.,
User-Agent: Cybermes-Security-Auditor/1.0). - Ensure all scripts accept a target URL as a CLI argument (
sys.argv[1]) with fallback to the tested default. - Include proper error handling (
try/except requests.exceptions.RequestException) and colorized status prints. - PoC scripts MUST demonstrate minimal-impact reproduction (e.g. read non-sensitive test fields or trigger benign diffs). NEVER script destructive actions.
2. FILE & PATH NAMING STANDARDS
- Vulnerability reports MUST be placed in
reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/findings/<severity>_<vuln_name>.md. - Use lowercase snake_case for all filenames (e.g.,
high_idor_documents.md,poc_login_bypass.py). - NEVER use square brackets
[...]or special shell characters in file names. - Informational observations, missing security headers, and negative test tables MUST go to
reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/evidence/recon_notes.md, NEVER scattered as individual files infindings/. - Maintain open permissions: all newly created files should have permissions readable by the host user (umask 0002 / 0666).
3. SECRET HYGIENE & CREDENTIAL PROTECTION
- NEVER commit real API keys, bearer tokens, or sensitive client passwords to Git repositories.
- When saving evidence or writing markdown reports, always redact sensitive tokens (e.g.,
Bearer [REDACTED_TEST_TOKEN],password: [REDACTED]). - All environment configurations must read from
.envor system environment variables.
4. REPORT AGGREGATION
- After writing or modifying finding files in
reports/<TARGET_SLUG>/findings/, always execute:aggregate_reports <TARGET_SLUG>to keepSUMMARY.mdandmetadata.jsonsynchronized.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 29 lines · 472 tokens per session scan A a6f3f8bf2604
cursorrules is a cursor rule published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 472 tokens to every session, about $0.0019 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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