Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add settings/dmoskov/shadowsky/settingsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dmoskov/shadowskyGrade D, and why
shadowsky scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
"Bash(chmod 777:*)" Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
"Bash(rm -rf /*)", Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
"Bash(curl:*)", What it actually says
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Bash",
"Edit",
"MultiEdit",
"Write",
"Read",
"Glob",
"Grep",
"LS",
"Task",
"Bash(git:*)",
"Bash(npm:*)",
"Bash(yarn:*)",
"Bash(pnpm:*)",
"Bash(python:*)",
"Bash(pip:*)",
"Bash(cargo:*)",
"Bash(go:*)",
"Bash(make:*)",
"Bash(docker:*)",
"Bash(aws:*)",
"Bash(terraform:*)",
"Bash(kubectl:*)",
"Bash(curl:*)",
"Bash(wget:*)",
"Bash(jq:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Bash(rm -rf /*)",
"Bash(sudo:*)",
"Bash(chmod 777:*)"
],
"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"
},
"env": {
"BASH_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000",
"BASH_MAX_OUTPUT_LENGTH": "20000",
"CLAUDE_BASH_MAINTAIN_PROJECT_WORKING_DIR": "1"
},
"includeCoAuthoredBy": true,
"cleanupPeriodDays": 30
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 45 lines scan D e8c755a26176
shadowsky is a settings file published in the GitHub repository dmoskov/shadowsky (17 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-01.
Other settings, from other repositories
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ui-ux-pro-max-skill
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