Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fschifone/claude-setup-wizardWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/settings/fschifone/claude-setup-wizard/settings)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/settings/fschifone/claude-setup-wizard/settings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/settings/fschifone/claude-setup-wizard/settings/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/settings/fschifone/claude-setup-wizard/settings"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/settings/fschifone/claude-setup-wizard/settings.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>Grade D, and why
claude-setup-wizard scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
"Bash(sudo rm:*)", Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
"Bash(rm -rf:*)", What it actually says
{
"$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/claude-code-settings.json",
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Read",
"Write",
"Edit",
"Glob",
"Grep",
"Bash(git status:*)",
"Bash(git diff:*)",
"Bash(git log:*)",
"Bash(git branch:*)",
"Bash(ls:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
"Bash(find:*)",
"Bash(pytest:*)",
"Bash(ruff:*)",
"Bash(uv run:*)",
"Bash(alembic:*)",
"Bash(swiftformat:*)",
"Bash(xcodebuild:*)"
],
"deny": [
"Bash(rm -rf:*)",
"Bash(rm -fr:*)",
"Bash(git push --force:*)",
"Bash(git push -f:*)",
"Bash(sudo rm:*)",
"Bash(chmod -R 777:*)",
"Bash(mkfs:*)",
"Bash(dd if=:*)",
"Bash(alembic downgrade:*)"
],
"_comment_deny": "Curl-pipe-shell patterns are blocked by hooks/block-dangerous-bash.sh because they require regex matching that Bash permissions do not support.",
"ask": [
"Bash(git push:*)",
"Bash(fly deploy:*)"
]
},
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}/.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-bash.sh\"",
"timeout": 5
},
{
"type": "command",
"command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}/.claude/hooks/log-bash.sh\"",
"timeout": 5
}
]
}
],
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}/.claude/hooks/auto-format.sh\"",
"timeout": 15
}
]
}
]
},
"statusLine": {
"type": "command",
"command": "bash \"${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}/.claude/statusline.sh\"",
"padding": 0
},
"env": {
"CLAUDE_TEST_CMD": "pytest -q"
}
}
What else settings.json configures
This page is one entry in a file that holds 3. Installing the file brings all of them; each is measured and scanned on its own page.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 81 lines scan D f9ba28ae1ced
claude-setup-wizard is a settings file published in the GitHub repository fschifone/claude-setup-wizard (2 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other settings, from other repositories
supabase
Agent settings declaring 2 hook events (SessionStart, PostToolUse).
superset
Agent settings declaring 1 hook event (PreToolUse).
RuView
Agent settings declaring 8 hook events (PreToolUse, PostToolUse, UserPromptSubmit, SessionStart) and 4 allowed tools.
claude-cookbooks
Agent settings declaring 2 hook events (SessionStart, PreToolUse).
orm
Agent settings declaring 4 hook events (PreToolUse, PostToolUse, WorktreeCreate, Stop) and 21 allowed tools.
claude-code-best-practice
Agent settings declaring 30 hook events (PreToolUse, PermissionRequest, PostToolUse, PostToolUseFailure) and 24 allowed tools.