Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add settings/otrebu/all-agents/settingsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/otrebu/all-agentsGrade E, and why
settings scanned grade E with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
"Bash(sudo rm -rf:*)", Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
"Read(~/.aws/credentials)", Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
"Bash(rm -rf /)", Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
"Bash(curl:*)", The source is not reproduced here
No licence file
A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 222 lines scan E b3f06ac827cb
settings is a settings file published in the GitHub repository otrebu/all-agents (2 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), with no licence file. Its token cost is not measured: this kind of file is read by the harness, not the model. A static security scan graded it E with 4 findings (asks for root, reaches for credential files, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other settings, from other repositories
supabase
Agent settings declaring 2 hook events (SessionStart, PostToolUse).
claude-cookbooks
Agent settings declaring 2 hook events (SessionStart, PreToolUse).
claude-code-best-practice
Agent settings declaring 30 hook events (PreToolUse, PermissionRequest, PostToolUse, PostToolUseFailure) and 24 allowed tools.
electron
Agent settings declaring 17 allowed tools.
uv
Agent settings declaring 2 hook events (SessionStart, PostToolUse).
ui-ux-pro-max-skill
Agent settings declaring 7 allowed tools.