Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/solidity-securitynpx skills add 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit --skill solidity-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kitWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00063 | $0.01867 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00933 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00373 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00187 |
Grade A, and why
solidity-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to solidity-security — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Solidity Security Standards
Language Rule
- Always respond in the same language the user is using. If the user asks in Chinese, respond in Chinese. If in English, respond in English.
Private Key Protection
- Store private keys in
.env, load viasource .env— never pass keys as CLI arguments - Never expose private keys in logs, screenshots, conversations, or commits
- Provide
.env.examplewith placeholder values for team reference - Add
.envto.gitignore— verify withgit statusbefore every commit
Security Decision Rules
When writing or reviewing Solidity code, apply these rules:
| Situation | Required Action |
|---|---|
| External ETH/token transfer | Use ReentrancyGuard + Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) pattern |
| ERC20 token interaction | Use SafeERC20 — call safeTransfer / safeTransferFrom, never raw transfer / transferFrom |
| Owner-only function | Inherit Ownable2Step (preferred) or Ownable from OZ 4.9.x — Ownable2Step prevents accidental owner loss |
| Multi-role access | Use AccessControl from @openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControl.sol |
| Token approval | Use safeIncreaseAllowance / safeDecreaseAllowance from SafeERC20 — never raw approve |
| Price data needed | Use Chainlink AggregatorV3Interface if feed exists; otherwise TWAP with min-liquidity check — never use spot pool price directly |
| Upgradeable contract | Prefer UUPS (UUPSUpgradeable) over TransparentProxy; always use Initializable |
| Solidity version < 0.8.0 | Must use SafeMath — but strongly prefer upgrading to 0.8.20+ |
| Emergency scenario | Inherit Pausable, add whenNotPaused to user-facing functions; keep admin/emergency functions unpaused |
| Whitelist / airdrop | Use MerkleProof for gas-efficient verification — never store full address lists on-chain |
| Signature-based auth | Use ECDSA + EIP712 — never roll custom signature verification |
| Signature content | Signature must bind chainId + nonce + msg.sender + deadline — prevent replay and cross-chain reuse |
| Cross-chain bridge / third-party dependency | Audit all inherited third-party contract code — never assume dependencies are safe |
| Deprecated / legacy contracts | Permanently pause or selfdestruct deprecated contracts — never leave unused contracts callable on-chain |
| UUPS upgrade pattern | _authorizeUpgrade must have onlyOwner; implementation constructor calls _disableInitializers(); retain onlyProxy on upgradeTo — EVMbench/basin H-01 |
| Multi-contract trust boundary | Router/Registry relay calls must verify source contract authorization; never trust caller identity inside flash loan callbacks — EVMbench/noya H-08 |
| Counter/ID + external call | All counter increments and ID assignments must complete before external calls; ETH refunds must be last — EVMbench/phi H-06 |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 134 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A 07340c2c36b2
solidity-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit (4 stars, last pushed 22d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 1,867 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to solidity-security, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
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web3-methodology-research
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web3-grep-arsenal
Master grep command arsenal for Web3 smart contract auditing. Use when starting a new protocol scan, before deep code review, or when hunting specific vulnerability classes.