Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/token-antiflashnpx skills add 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit --skill token-antiflashgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/token-antiflash)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/token-antiflash"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit/token-antiflash.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00091 | $0.05435 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.02717 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01087 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00543 |
Grade A, and why
token-antiflash scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 456 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Token-Level Flash Loan Prevention Design Patterns
Language Rule
- Always respond in the same language the user is using. If the user asks in Chinese, respond in Chinese. If in English, respond in English.
Scope: Applicable to ERC20 token contracts that need protection against flash loan attacks at the token contract level. Complements the
defi-securityskill (protocol-level) with token-internal defense mechanisms. All parameters mentioned below are design references — actual values should be determined based on project requirements, tokenomics, and market conditions.
Workflow Rule
When this skill is triggered, DO NOT directly implement all strategies. Follow this workflow:
- Assess: Identify the project's threat model — what type of token (meme, community, DeFi ecosystem), what value at stake, what attack vectors are realistic
- Present: Show the developer the Strategy Decision Matrix and Combination Guide. Clearly explain the trade-offs of each strategy (gas cost, UX friction, implementation complexity)
- Let the developer choose: Ask the developer which protection level (Basic / Standard / Advanced / Maximum) or which specific strategies they want. Do NOT assume a protection level
- Confirm parameters: For each chosen strategy, confirm key design parameters with the developer (e.g., tax tiers, volume limit percentages, cooldown granularity) before writing code
- Implement: Only after developer confirmation, implement the selected strategies with the agreed parameters
Exception: If the developer explicitly says "implement all" or "maximum protection", skip steps 2-4 and implement the Maximum combination. If the developer specifies exact strategies by number, skip to step 4 for those strategies.
Version Compatibility
| OpenZeppelin Version | Hook to Override | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| OZ 5.x (Solidity ≥0.8.20) | _update(address from, address to, uint256 amount) |
State already updated when hook runs |
| OZ 4.x (Solidity <0.8.20) | _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount) |
State NOT yet updated; reads are pre-transfer |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 456 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A ccb295fd7c23
token-antiflash is a skill published in the GitHub repository 0xlayerghost/solidity-agent-kit (4 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 5,435 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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