Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai --skill implementing-code-signing-for-artifactsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00062 | $0.01757 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00031 | $0.00879 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00351 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 234 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implementing Code Signing for Artifacts
When to Use
- When establishing artifact integrity verification to prevent supply chain tampering
- When compliance requires cryptographic proof that build artifacts are authentic and unmodified
- When distributing software to customers who need to verify publisher identity
- When implementing zero-trust deployment pipelines that reject unsigned artifacts
- When meeting SLSA Level 2+ requirements for provenance and integrity
Do not use for encrypting artifacts (signing provides integrity, not confidentiality), for container image signing specifically (use cosign), or for source code authentication (use commit signing).
Prerequisites
- GPG key pair for traditional signing or Sigstore account for keyless signing
- Code signing certificate from a Certificate Authority for public distribution
- CI/CD pipeline with access to signing keys or identity provider
- Verification infrastructure in deployment pipelines
Workflow
Step 1: Generate and Manage Signing Keys
# Generate GPG key for artifact signing
gpg --full-generate-key --batch <<EOF
Key-Type: eddsa
Key-Curve: ed25519
Subkey-Type: eddsa
Subkey-Curve: ed25519
Name-Real: CI Build System
Name-Email: [email protected]
Expire-Date: 1y
%no-protection
EOF
# Export public key for distribution
gpg --armor --export [email protected] > signing-key.pub
# Export private key for CI/CD (store in secrets manager)
gpg --armor --export-secret-keys [email protected] > signing-key.priv
Step 2: Sign Build Artifacts in CI/CD
# .github/workflows/build-sign.yml
name: Build and Sign
on:
push:
tags: ['v*']
jobs:
build-sign:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write # For Sigstore keyless signing
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build artifacts
run: |
make build
sha256sum dist/* > dist/checksums.sha256
- name: Import GPG Key
run: |
echo "${{ secrets.GPG_PRIVATE_KEY }}" | gpg --batch --import
gpg --list-secret-keys
- name: Sign artifacts
run: |
for file in dist/*; do
gpg --detach-sign --armor --local-user [email protected] "$file"
done
- name: Install cosign for keyless signing
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@v3
- name: Keyless sign with Sigstore
run: |
for file in dist/*.tar.gz; do
cosign sign-blob "$file" \
--output-signature "${file}.sig" \
--output-certificate "${file}.cert" \
--yes
done
- name: Create Release with signed artifacts
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
files: |
dist/*
dist/*.asc
dist/*.sig
dist/*.cert
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 234 lines · 62 tokens per session scan A ce1d6eb5837e
implementing-code-signing-for-artifacts is a skill published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (57 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 1,757 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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