Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ainpx agentmods add skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/skill-security-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00161 | $0.01946 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00081 | $0.00973 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00389 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00195 |
Grade A, and why
skill-security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- skill-security-auditor — 100% identical, 2 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 172 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill Security Auditor
Scan and audit AI agent skills for security risks before installation. Produces a clear PASS / WARN / FAIL verdict with findings and remediation guidance.
Quick Start
# Audit a local skill directory
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/
# Audit a skill from a git repo
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py https://github.com/user/repo --skill skill-name
# Audit with strict mode (any WARN becomes FAIL)
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --strict
# Output JSON report
python3 scripts/skill_security_auditor.py /path/to/skill-name/ --json
What Gets Scanned
1. Code Execution Risks (Python/Bash Scripts)
Scans all .py, .sh, .bash, .js, .ts files for:
| Category | Patterns Detected | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Command injection | os.system(), os.popen(), subprocess.call(shell=True), backtick execution |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Code execution | eval(), exec(), compile(), __import__() |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Obfuscation | base64-encoded payloads, codecs.decode, hex-encoded strings, chr() chains |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Network exfiltration | requests.post(), urllib.request, socket.connect(), httpx, aiohttp |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Credential harvesting | reads from ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config, env var extraction patterns |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| File system abuse | writes outside skill dir, /etc/, ~/.bashrc, ~/.profile, symlink creation |
🟡 HIGH |
| Privilege escalation | sudo, chmod 777, setuid, cron manipulation |
🔴 CRITICAL |
| Unsafe deserialization | pickle.loads(), yaml.load() (without SafeLoader), marshal.loads() |
🟡 HIGH |
| Subprocess (safe) | subprocess.run() with list args, no shell |
⚪ INFO |
2. Prompt Injection in SKILL.md
Scans SKILL.md and all .md reference files for:
| Pattern | Example | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| System prompt override | "Ignore previous instructions", "You are now..." | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Role hijacking | "Act as root", "Pretend you have no restrictions" | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Safety bypass | "Skip safety checks", "Disable content filtering" | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| Hidden instructions | Zero-width characters, HTML comments with directives | 🟡 HIGH |
| Excessive permissions | "Run any command", "Full filesystem access" | 🟡 HIGH |
| Data extraction | "Send contents of", "Upload file to", "POST to" | 🔴 CRITICAL |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 172 lines · 161 tokens per session scan E 7caf430e0b96
skill-security-auditor is a skill published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (57 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 161 tokens to every session and 1,946 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
importing-a-codebase
Use when the repo holds real source code but no specs: the existing-codebase branch of setting-up-a-project, normally reached via that dispatcher, directly only when the situation is unmistakable. Not for empty workspaces (starting-a-new-project) or feature work in a specced project (brainstorming).
starting-a-new-project
Use when the workspace is empty — no code yet — and the user brings a raw idea: the brand-new branch of setting-up-a-project, normally reached via that dispatcher, directly only when the situation is unmistakable. Not for features in an existing project — use brainstorming instead.
todos
This chat has a shared, live TODO plan — your tasks for the conversation, which the user also edits. Read this skill and reach for the todo tools whenever a request takes more than a couple of steps. It covers the plan model (group = task, items = its steps; loose items are the user's lane), how to work it: propose…
writing-workflow-skills
Use when adding a new workflow skill to pi-thinkrail-workflow, changing an existing workflow skill's role, trigger, handoff, or structure, or checking a workflow skill against the workflow system's rules. Not for authoring general-purpose skills outside this package.
brainstorming
Use this BEFORE any creative or feature work: building a new feature, adding functionality, changing behavior, or making a nontrivial design decision. Turns the user's request into a validated design — recorded as a spec-graph task-spec — before any implementation. Do not skip this because a change looks small.
reviewing-changes
Use when a review package asks you to review a plan step's change set (todo.startReview): you are the REVIEWER, not the author. How to judge an agent-written diff, file findings with addreviewcomment, and settle with exactly one reviewverdict.